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Patents as Credentials
Jason Rantanen*
Sarah E. Jack**
Abstract
The conventional explanation for why people seek patents
draws on a simple economic rationale. Patents, the usual story goes,
provide a financial reward: the ability to engage in
supracompetitive pricing by excluding others from practicing the
claimed technology. People are drawn to file for patents because
that is how these economic rewards are secured. While scholars
have proposed variations on the basic exclusionary mechanism, and
there is a general acknowledgement that patents can affect a firm’s
reputation, the actual mechanisms of patents’ effect on
individuals —human beings—remains relatively uncharted.
In this Article we offer a concrete theory and framework for
understanding the relationship between patents and individuals in
terms other than the lure of supracompetitive pricing. Our
framework focuses on the idea of patents as credentials: formal
abstractions of a person’s inventive nature. By acting as boundaried
and identifiable indicators, patents serve purposes beyond the
strictly exclusionary. One purpose is to satisfy social or self-worth
needs. The formalization of invention through a patent allows those
human beings who want to be recognized by society as inventors to
be so recognized, thus fulfilling an innate human desire. A second
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purpose is economic—but not because of the power to exclude.
Instead, as the literature has recognized on the firm level, viewing
patents as credentials acknowledges their role as economic signals,
indicating particular characteristics possessed by the recipient.
Considered in these terms, patents serving as credentials are
all around us, from resumes and curriculum vitae to framed
patents in offices. But these examples only scratch the surface of the
role of patents as credentials in our society. By using the formal lens
of patents as credentials, we demonstrate that there are reasons why
individuals seek patents beyond the lure of supracompetitive
pricing.
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I. Introduction
Law students are taught to think of patents as the cold tools
of business: mechanisms by which firms compete and control,
attack and defend. The value of patents flows from the power they
grant their owner to exclude others from making or using a new
technology. The economic might of patents is at the heart of both
great industrial battles that affect the fate of humankind1 and
smaller disputes between a wide cast of players. All of the patent
cases that law students read, and virtually all of the scholarly
commentary of their professors, revolve around the right to exclude
offered by patents.
The conventional story of patents, the story that all students
of patent law learn by heart, draws on a simple economic rationale.
Patents provide a financial benefit: the ability to engage in
supracompetitive pricing by excluding others from practicing the
claimed technology.2 People are drawn to file for patents because
that is how the economic rewards are secured.3 A large body of
1. See generally CHRISTOPHER BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW: ALEXANDER
GRAHAM BELL AND THE PATENT THAT CHANGED AMERICA (Harvard Univ. Press
2015) (using the Bell patent claiming telephonic communication as an example).
2. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 295 (2003) (“One reason patent
protection can be more valuable than copyright protection is that a patent
protects against any duplication of the patented invention rather than merely
forbidding the copying of it.”).
3. See, e.g., id. at 294 (“The conventional rationale for granting legal
protection to inventions . . . is the difficulty that a producer may encounter in
trying to recover his fixed costs of research and development when the product or
process that embodies a new invention is readily copiable.”).

314

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311 (2019)

scholarship on patents and patent law has explored variations on
this basic economic incentive to patent.4
But the real story of why people seek patents is more complex,
as scholars recognize.5 Clarissa Long, for example, explained that
firms may patent as a form of economic signaling—to show others
that they possess certain characteristics.6 More recently, Dan Burk
drew on the “new institutional” school of sociology to argue that
organizational patenting is driven to some extent by a narrative
“as to what is socially acceptable or desirable,” rather than being a
neo-classical rational response to an economic incentive.7 Surveys
of businesses’ motivations for patenting indicate that reputation is
a major driver, particularly among firms seeking to build their

4. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and
the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1255, 1261 (2009) (studying the competitive and economic incentives
start-ups have for seeking patents); Robert P. Merges, Philosophical Foundations
of IP Law: The Law and Economics Paradigm, in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S. Menell et al. ed.,
forthcoming 2019) (describing how the utilitarian theory of intellectual property
and using a cost-benefit analysis fits well with economics but noting alternative
theories of intellectual property can also be understood from a law and economics
perspective); Theresa Veer & Florian Jell, Contributing to Markets for
Technology? A Comparison of Patent Filing Motives of Individual Inventors,
Small Companies and Universities, 32 TECHNOVATION 513, 515 (2012) (studying
the motivation of applicants to the European Patent office).
5. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, On the Sociology of Patenting, 101 MINN. L. REV.
421, 442 (2016); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002)
(challenging the convention that a patent’s value only comes from exclusivity).
6. See Long, supra note 5, at 646 (explaining how investors may believe
patents or research and development rates will correspond to future value of the
company).
7. See Burk, supra note 5, at 442 (developing an alternate explanation for
why individuals choose to seek a patent that fits two positions: on the one hand,
inventors may seek patents because the credential is part of a social role; on the
other, inventors may seek patents because patents increase future economic
opportunities and provide self-validation).
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identity and status.8 Some literature suggests that firms may
patent as a way to reward their employees.9
When it comes to the reasons why individuals—human
beings —are driven to patent, however, the literature is sparser.
There is unquestionably a generalized understanding that patents
provide some form of reputational benefit, but the mechanism has
proven elusive.10 In The Eureka Myth, Jessica Silbey emphasizes
the importance of reputation to creators but concludes that patent
law is misaligned with creators’ interest in reputation.11 Jeanne
Fromer’s work observes that certain “expressive incentives” that
recognize a creator’s moral rights can complement the usual
utilitarian view of patents.12 She identifies attribution as one
incentive that can promote inventorship; the unstated corollary is
that inventors will seek patents to establish that attribution.13 In
another recent article, Will Hubbard discusses “inventing norms,”
8. See generally Knut Blind et al., Motives to Patent: Empirical Evidence
from Germany, 35 RES. POL’Y 655 (2006) (reviewing surveys examining small
firms’ motivations to patent and conducting its own survey of those motivations
in German); Graham et al., supra note 4, at 1264 (surveying high technology
firms’ motivations for patenting); Veer & Jell, supra note 4, at 515 (reporting on
data from the 2006 European Patent Office questionnaire).
9. See Blind, supra note 8, at 670 (“There is obviously a converging trend
among sectors regarding the use of patents to motivate employees and to measure
performance.”); Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of
Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49, 54 (2006) (describing attribution systems in
business).
10. See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND
EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 149 – 83 (Stanford Univ. Press 2015) (offering
an example of the recognition of reputation as a driver for creators, as well as the
slipperiness of that concept).
11. See id. at 149–53 (stating that within intellectual property law
trademark is best suited to address reputation, while copyright and patent law
are less pertinent to regulating reputation).
12. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98
VA. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2012) (“The law’s careful use of expressive incentives can
bolster the utilitarian inducement to create valuable intellectual property.”).
13. See id. at 1790 – 94 (explaining how and why a work’s attribution to its
creator “can bolster an author’s or inventor’s reputation [and] concretize[] the
personhood interest creators have in viewing their creations as strong
components of their self-concept”); see also Stephanie Plamondon Bair, The
Psychology of Patent Protection, 48 CONN. L. REV. 297, 320 (2015) (suggesting
attribution is “a powerful motivator of knowledge sharing because of the promise
of enhanced feelings of competency . . . that it offers”).
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which he defines as the societal norms that promote invention.14
His primary analysis focuses on what causes individuals to
invent,15 but in the course of his analysis Hubbard refers to patents
as credentials (much like a degree) that may be used to signal to
friends and family that the inventor on the patent is worthy of
respect.16 Similarly, in his opus on non-utilitarian rationales for
intellectual property, Robert Merges alludes to the idea that
intellectual property rights in general serve as some kind of
credential to creators.17 He describes the rights as a type of reward
for the bravery of releasing intellectual property to the world.18
Merges also discusses the inventor’s pseudo moral right to be listed
as an inventor.19 This idea of a “moral right to credit”20 has received
support from several courts.21

14. See William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 373 (2011)
(comparing social norms to inventing norms, “which are social attitudes of
approval for successful invention”).
15. See id. at 369 (arguing that, in addition to economic motivations,
“inventors are . . . motivated by social norms, that is, shared normative beliefs
favoring certain actions while disfavoring others”).
16. See id. at 400 (“Patents are also important in professional circles, and
patentees often treat issued patents as a credential-like a degree.”). Dan Burk’s
concept of patents as “boundary objects” raises similar themes. See Dan L. Burk,
Patent Silences, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1603, 1606 (2016) (defining boundary objects as
“artifacts that have sufficiently definite meaning to be useful in disparate social
worlds, but which simultaneously are sufficiently ambiguous to become objects of
collaboration between such disparate social worlds”).
17. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 311 (2011)
(“IP gives [creators] a reason to believe that some day, for some of them anyway,
a real career could be made by doing what they are best at.”).
18. See id. at 310–11 (noting that “IP rights represent an important token of
respect and recognition for those souls brave enough to launch their
creations . . .”).
19. See id. at 158 (“The moral right to credit exists in patent law as well. An
inventor has a right to have his name on a patent.”).
20. Id.
21. See Czarnik v. Illumina, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 252, 256 (D. Del. 2006)
(concluding that the plaintiff had standing to correct inventorship because “he
ha[d] suffered harm to his reputation and standing in the scientific community”);
see also Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[B]eing
considered an inventor of important subject matter is a mark of success in one’s
field . . . . Pecuniary consequences may well flow from being designated as an
inventor.”).
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This Article adds to the existing literature by articulating a
concrete theory and framework for understanding the relationship
between patents and individuals that builds on Hubbard and
Merges’s idea of patents functioning as credentials. This theory
and framework is situated within the doctrinal structure of patent
law, and the formal concept of patents as credentials has
implications for patent law’s own future.
We emphasize that the idea of “patents as credentials” is not
merely a rhetorical substitute for the generalized understanding
that patents provide a reputational benefit. This would not move
the ball beyond what Silbey, Frommer, Hubbard, and Merges have
already articulated. Instead, we argue that the real mechanism of
patents’ reputational effect is not merely some generalized
benefit—perhaps
articulated
through
the
rhetoric
of
“credential”—but rather the specific abstraction and formality of a
patent. Put another way, it is precisely because of the artificiality
of patents that they are able to function as a mechanism to enhance
one’s reputation.22
Just as this Article uses the formalized abstraction of
credentials to understand the reputational effect of patents, so too
do patents provide a formalized abstraction of the contributions
and characteristics of a human being. In other words, we are using
a social construct to analyze something that is itself a social
construct.23 Viewed in these terms, the reason why this Article is
titled “Patents as Credentials” rather than “Patents as
Reputation” is because a central theme of this Article is that
formalization matters—after all, formalization is why, as this
Article intends to show, patents are such powerful mechanisms of
reputation and self-fulfillment. The formal lens of credentials
offers important insights into the non-exclusionary role of patents.
22. This, we think, is perhaps a way out of what Silbey perceives as a
disconnect between intellectual property rights (or at least, patents) and
reputation: while reputation may be too slippery to own, one can possess certain
elements from which one’s reputation is formed. See SILBEY, supra note 10, at 181
(“Reputation is hard to ‘own’ in the way that property (or IP) might be owned and
defined.”).
23. Infra Part IV; see Fisk, supra note 9, at 1135 (“Patent law thus adopted
the Romantic notion of the individual as the inventor or originator of an idea, and
turned it into a legal category that supported a whole system of property rights,
thus turning a legal category back into a social fact.”).

318

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311 (2019)

At its core, our explanation of the patent credential is simple:
some human beings want to be recognized by society as inventors.
But, claiming to be an inventor without evidence is unlikely to
persuade the masses—or even, perhaps, friends. Patents serve as
powerful evidence that an individual is an inventor.24 Just as a
doctoral degree in history might indicate that one is a historian or
an award from a community organization might be seen as a bona
fide certification of one’s commitment to public interest, obtaining
a patent shows that the person named on its face is a real-life,
government-certified inventor.25 Regardless of whether a
particular patent conveys an economically valuable measure of
exclusion, the inventorship recognition alone may drive some
individuals to seek patents. Intertwined with this formal
recognition is the element of self-validation that patents provide.26
In a way, obtaining a patent is similar to passing a test—a
mechanism of external recognition of achievement that adds to
one’s own identity.
The power of patents as credentials is one that is based on the
core attributes of patents themselves. Perhaps most prominently,
patents
have
powerful
social
recognition.27
They
indicate —perhaps even define—the existence of an invention. The
individual or individuals named as inventors on the patent are,
ipso facto, inventors. Patents possess a deep-rooted, historical
veracity. With a patent, one can draw upon the likes of Morse,
Edison, and Bell. Legally, only a true inventor may receive a
patent.28
Beyond their social meaning, patents exhibit the attributes of
a high-quality credential. They are issued by an entity that

24. See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 401 (arguing that one reason Thomas
Edison is considered America’s most prolific inventor is because he was named an
inventor on over 1,000 patents).
25. See id. (explaining that patents help identify persons worthy of respect
and esteem by communicating information regarding an invention’s attributes).
26. C.f. Bair, supra note 13, at 310 (explaining that the aims of personality
theory, which is “primarily concerned with validating the personhood of creators
through their works,” may be achieved by ensuring a creator receives credit for
her work).
27. Infra Part IV.A.
28. Infra Part IV.B.2.a.
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possesses substantial legitimacy.29 There is the informational
content of the credential, provided through direct certification as
well as signaling and filtering. And while the basic requirements
to obtain a patent are simple enough for everyone to understand
(even a child),30 the facts that satisfy these requirements are often
quite complex and require a high level of substantive technical
knowledge to understand and analyze under the legal
requirements—hence the necessity for relying on the credential.31
Whether the facts satisfy the requirements is a determination
made by an Examiner employed by a central Patent Office.32 The
Examiner assesses and measures whether each application really
claims a new and fully disclosed invention—in other words, that
the self-proclaimed inventor really is in possession of an invention.
In this way, patents may be even better than a degree from a fancy
institution: they bear the government’s own seal, proclaiming one
to be a real inventor. A real red ribbon.33
The value of this ribbon is more than just economic, although
it can be that. As with a traditional academic credential, a patent
may raise an individual in the eyes of an employer—an economic
function that may be the individual version of Clarissa Long’s

29. See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 399 (“Because a patent issues only after
administrative examination, the patent indicates with at least modest credibility
that [the] requirements for patentability have been met and thus identifies the
patentee as the creator of a meaningful new invention.”).
30. Infra Part IV.B.2.a.
31. See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 398 (describing the patent examiners as
professionals “with experience and training in the technological field to which the
invention relates”).
32. See id. at 399 (describing the process by which inventors must convince
patent examiners to grant their inventions).
33. Consider the red ribbons of Edward Bellamy’s influential nineteenth
century novel Looking Backward. See ERNEST FREEBERG, THE AGE OF EDISON:
ELECTRIC LIGHT AND THE INVENTION OF MODERN AMERICA 153 (2013) (quoting
EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD, 2000 – 1887, at 226 (1888))
In the socialist utopia depicted in Edward Bellamy’s bestselling novel
Looking Backward, 2000 – 1887, the nineteenth century time traveler
found that inventive geniuses in the better world of the year 2000
created new ideas simply for the chance to serve mankind, the reward
of more time to pursue invention, and the dream of winning he society’s
highest reward: the honor of sporting a red ribbon that marked the
wearer as a great human benefactor.
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Patent Signaling of firms.34 But patents can also have social
caché—value beyond the purely monetary: the sweat on the palm
of an interviewee as he sees the stack of black patent cubes behind
the interviewer,35 the joy of knowing that your friend is an inventor
of a patented technology, the warm glow that being recognized as
contributing something new to society may bring.36 By serving as
credentials, patents provide a measure of societal validation of an
individual’s contribution, bolstering the recipient’s innate sense of
self-worth.
Examples of the use of patents as credentials abound
throughout society and history. We address patents’ appearance
in academia, their use as rewards by employers, and their
necessity for entry into honorary societies of inventors.37
Ultimately, however, this Article can only scratch the surface of
these examples. It suggests, however, that further research on the
credentialing function of patents—particularly, empirical
research38—is called for.
Some of the normative implications of the credentialing
function of patents are clear. For one, if society correctly values
practical innovation as a social good—an assumption we are
willing to make—then the credentialing function of patents aligns
fairly well with recognizing inventors for contributing to that social
good. It is not perfect, but given the relative rigor of the
examination process, the height of the bar to achieve the
credential, and the identity of the issuer, it is probably better than
many other credentials at providing evidence for the characteristic
for which it stands. Patent credentials may also serve a valuable
function by identifying individuals with inventive abilities, thus
providing information that will be useful to future employers or
business partners.39
34. See generally Long, supra note 5.
35. See KEITH CURTIS, AFTER THE SOFTWARE WARS 92 (2016) (recalling the
author’s interview for a new position within Microsoft and the tinge of jealousy
he felt at seeing his interviewer’s patents on display in his office).
36. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759)
(describing the human desire for approbation).
37. Infra Part V.
38. Infra Part V.E.
39. See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 401 (“[P]atents . . . thereby help identify
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That said, there is a dark side of credentials, one that patents
are hardly immune to. We acknowledge, as we must, that patent
law is not perfect, that overreliance on credentials is problematic,
and misunderstanding of the meaning of a patent can lead to ruin
for the inventor.40 Perhaps even more concerning is that
patents—as with other types of credentials—can be mechanisms
that preserve existing castes and restrict opportunities for those
who lack access to them. The history of patents shows that this
criticism has merit, although the story is more complex than a
simple power hierarchy. This may be precisely because of the
formalized nature of patents—in other words, their function as
credentials.
Our normative assessment leads into our final conclusion, one
for those who crave a legal payoff from the theory of patents as
credentials. If we as a society think that patents do serve a
valuable role as credentials—or at least, that their benefits as
signals outweigh the costs of credentialism—then we should take
that concern into account when evaluating changes to the patent
law. Particularly, recent changes to patent law have shifted
patents further toward being stark tools of business.41 Those
changes, we suggest, might make sense on one level, but they fail
to take into account the effect of altering these symbols’ meanings
to human beings.
This Article proceeds as follows. We begin by describing the
formal construct of a credential in Part II. Part III explains the
legal aspects of patents, including their substantive and
procedural components. Our central thesis that patents should be
understood as credentialsformal abstractions of a person’s
inventive natureis argued in Part IV. Part V provides examples
of patents serving as credentials across a wide landscape of society.
Finally, in Part VI, we assess the idea of patents as credentials
from a normative perspective. We close in Part VII with some
thoughts on the implications of viewing patents as credentials.

persons worthy of respect and esteem pursuant to inventing norms.”).
40. Infra Part VI.
41. Infra Part VII.
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II. What is a Credential?
This calls for emergency action! That man is a spellbinder.
I want his credentials.42
—Mayor Shinn

A credential is a formalized indicator that a person possesses
a particular, otherwise difficult to observe attribute.43 A credential
is typically embodied as a literal document or certificate that
provides evidence of a person’s identity or qualifications, although
the concept of a credential is not limited to its physical
incarnation.44 A credential provides a mechanism by which
uncertainties and issues of trust between parties can be reduced.45
“Credentialing seeks to mediate between parties by enabling
trusting relationships where doubt, uncertainty, or risk exists.”46
The use of credentials “arises where, for any of a variety of
structural reasons, a party cannot easily judge for itself on the
42. MEREDITH WILLSON, THE MUSIC MAN sc. 5. Tangential to the main plot of
The Music Man is the mayor and school board’s quest to obtain “Professor” Harold
Hill’s credentials. Id. They are so focused on the credentials that Hill is forced to
resort to an array of shenanigans to distract them. Id.
43. See David K. Brown, The Social Sources of Educational Credentialism:
Status Cultures, Labor Markets, and Organizations, 74 SOC. EDUC. (EXTRA ISSUE)
19, 26 – 27 (2001) (discussing credentials as “formal rules” in labor market
recruitment).
44. See, e.g., Credential, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (Catherine
Soanes & Angus Stevenson eds., 2d ed. 2003) (“A qualification, achievement,
quality, or aspect of a person’s background, especially when used to indicate their
suitability for something . . . .”); Credential, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (Phillip
Babcock Gove ed., 1971) (“[S]omething that gives a title to credit or confidence.”);
Tony Buon & Bob Compton, Credentials, Credentialism and Employee Selection,
28 ASIA PAC. J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 126, 126 (1990) (“Literally, credentials are
letters or certificates that establish the position, authority or identity of the
bearer.”); see also David K. Brown, Credentialing, in THE BLACKWELL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY 1 (George Ritzer ed., 2016) (“Credentialing is at once
a social relationship, a cultural system, and a historical process that entails
assurances from a third party that another party in a two-party relationship
possesses desirable qualities such as knowledge, technical competence, moral
character, and legitimate authority.”).
45. See Brown, supra note 43, at 26 (“Degree holders thus hold power over
nondegree [sic] holders on the basis of a formal claim to competence or
untrustworthiness.”).
46. Brown, supra note 44.
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substantive uncertainties attendant upon social transactions.”47
To put it another way, “[credentials] are tokens of trust used to
vouch that people are who they say they are, and have the qualities
they claim to have.”48
Credentials thus stand for a particular characteristic
possessed by an individual. They are “a formal abstraction from
substantive matters that claims to be a legitimate representation
of some substantive reality, such that one party can trust the
credential to be good enough to stand for a substantive scrutiny of
whatever the credential represents.”49 For example, credentials
can indicate what amount and type of education an individual has
completed.50 But credentials are hardly limited to education.51
They can be understood in broader terms as “abstractions that
stand above the substance of various lived experiences”52 or as
“means by which social actors can send and receive information
under conditions of social uncertainty and anonymity.”53
47.
48.

Id.
SHERYL L. GRANT, WHAT COUNTS AS LEARNING: OPEN DIGITAL BADGES FOR
NEW
OPPORTUNITIES
10
(2014),
https://dmlhub.net/wpcontent/uploads/files/WhatCountsAsLearning_Grant.pdf.
49. Brown, supra note 44; see also DAVID B. BILLS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
EDUCATION AND WORK 76 (2004) (explaining that employers rely on credentials
because they are “a cheap, easily observed, and socially acceptable signal that
employers can use when they have little other information”); David P. Baker,
Forward and Backward, Horizontal and Vertical: Transformation of
Occupational Credentialing in the Schooled Society, 29 RES. SOC. STRATIFICATION
& MOBILITY 5, 6 (2011) (arguing that “educational degrees are fast becoming
universally synonymous with human capacity in the occupational structure”);
David K. Brown & David B. Bills, An Overture for the Sociology of Credentialing:
Empirical, Theoretical, and Moral Considerations, 29 RES. SOC. STRATIFICATION
& MOBILITY 133, 135 (2011) (“Credentials are sources of power for individual
holders insofar as they effectively block substantive judgments about their actual
abilities.”).
50. See Brown, supra note 44; BILLS, supra note 49, at 36 (noting that
“Americans believe that education and work are intimately related, and that this
is how it should be”).
51. See Brown & Bills, supra note 49, at 134 (“Memberships in various forms
of consumption groups undoubtedly provide credentialing powers analogous to
educational degrees.”).
52. Id.
53. BILLS, supra note 49, at 59; see also Baker, supra note 49, at 5–6
(proposing that “education as an institution provides the logic by which
educational credentialing becomes evermore legitimate, more so than from forces
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Credentials might also be analogized to data compression, the
process of reducing the size of a signal or other information source
while still conveying information.54 Just as a novel might be
distilled to just its plot, characters and symbols, so too can a
credential compress a multi-year experience into a diploma. In
short, credentials are a mechanism of information transfer that
distills complex, often difficult to observe information into a
portable, translatable indicator.55
Credentials fulfill this information communication function in
multiple ways. Perhaps the strongest way is through their role as
symbols, full of the meaning society attaches to them.56 A
credential abstracts an experience, characteristic or set of skills
and knowledge into a more symbolic form with its own socially
constructed meaning.57 For example, “[d]egrees direct people to
accept an abstraction (the symbolic, cultural embodiment of the
degree itself) as a representation of something else (substantive
knowledge, skill, or loyalty).”58
Beyond the meaning that society ascribes to the credential,
credentials communicate information in and of themselves. For
one thing, a credential communicates certain pieces of information
directly to its audience.59 A particular degree, for example,
outside the institution itself such as the economy and labor market demand”);
Brown, supra note 44; Sheryl Grant, Building Collective Belief in Badges:
Designing Trust Networks, in FOUNDATION OF DIGITAL BADGES AND
MICRO-CREDENTIALS 97, 103 (Dirk Ifenthaler, et al. eds., 2016). See generally
STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTATION IN
AMERICA (Michael Useem & James D. Wright eds., 1993).
54. See, e.g., DAVID SALOMON, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO DATA
COMPRESSION 5 (2008).
55. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 49, at 12 (“[E]ducational degrees . . . emerge
as indicators of development of the individual with widely assumed repercussions
for all aspects of the person . . . .”).
56. See Brown, supra note 43, at 26 (discussing Weber’s argument that
credentials are a form of social credit that symbolically facilitate exchanges under
conditions of social uncertainty).
57. See id. (discussing credentials in the context of education and arguing
that credentials abstract qualities that are held to persist over time).
58. Id.
59. See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 400 (offering patents as an example of a
credential that communicates information even to non-technical audiences who
nevertheless understand the significance of the simple fact that a patent has been
granted).
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indicates that the degree recipient has met the requirements of
that degree: she has taken certain classes and met prescribed
minimum standards.60 A credential can also serve a screening
function—in other words, to sort out individuals of differing
abilities, thereby conveying information to the purchasers of
labor.61 As described by Kenneth Arrow, the function of higher
education is not to contribute to cognition or socialization, but
rather to filter out those who will produce the greatest economic
productivity.62 Credentials can also function as economic signals or
communications about unobservable characteristics that are less
costly for desirable individuals to provide than for others.63 That
is, if obtaining an education is less costly for “good” employees than
for “bad” employees, investment in obtaining an education is a
potential signal that an employer may use to distinguish the good
prospective employees from the bad.64
One way to think about the information function of credentials
is to set it against the backdrop of what sociologist David Bills
describes as the “meritocracy” and “credentialism” models of
60. For example, the American Bar Association requires that graduates from
accredited law schools complete a minimum set of required classes. See ABA
STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 16 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017) (requiring a course in professional responsibility, two courses with a
substantial writing component, and a sizeable experiential learning experience).
Beyond the minimum requirements, each accredited law school sets its own
standards for receiving a J.D. See, e.g., UNIV. OF IOWA COLL. OF LAW, ACADEMIC
REQUIREMENTS
OVERVIEW
1–2
(2013),
https://law.uiowa.edu/sites/law.
uiowa.edu/files/curriculum_overview_0.pdf (setting out the school’s academic
requirements);
Degree
Requirements,
UNIV.
KAN.
SCH.
L.,
https://law.ku.edu/requiredcourses (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (same) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); J.D. Degree Requirements, YALE L. SCH.,
https://law.yale.edu/study-law-yale/degree-programs/jd-program/jd-degreerequirements (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (same) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
61. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Higher Education as a Filter, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 193,
194 (1973) (arguing that “higher education serves as a screening device, in that it
sorts out individuals of differing abilities”).
62. See id.
63. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECONOMICS 355, 358
(1973).
64. See id. (“It is not difficult to see that a signal will not effectively
distinguish one applicant from another, unless the costs of signaling are
negatively correlated with productive capability.”).
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education and work.65 In the meritocracy model, employers desire
employees with certain attributes such as knowledge, skill, and
work ethic.66 Credentials function as strong evidence that an
individual possesses the attributes tied to obtaining the
credential.67 Good credentials thus provide a high signal-to-noise
ratio.68 On the other hand, in the “credentialism” model,
credentials are simply arbitrarily handed out and bear little actual
relationship to those attributes necessary to perform a job
successfully—or at all.69 Credentials thus bear a low (or zero)
signal-to-noise ratio; indeed, there may be little informational
value of the credentials at all.70
Credentials exist on more than a purely economic level,
however.71 As sociologist David Brown observes, “[c]redentialing is
at once a social relationship, a cultural system, and a historical
process that entails assurances from a third party that another
party in a two-party relationship possesses desirable qualities such
as knowledge, technical competence, moral character, and
legitimate authority.”72 Much of the contemporary research on

65. BILLS, supra note 49, at 37–60.
66. Id. at 41–44. Note that none of these characteristics need be
conceptualized narrowly. “Skill,” for example, could include such attributes as an
ability to write clearly, analyze problems rigorously, or function as part of an
interdisciplinary team.
67. See id. at 59–60 (discussing Steven Nock’s theory of the relationship
between surveillance and reputation, which suggests that “education credentials
provide a reason to have confidence in the ability and reliability of strangers”).
68. See C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL
SYS. TECHNICAL J. 379, 381 (1948) (arguing that the maximum amount of
information that can reliably be carried through a signal is limited by the amount
of noise in the channel).
69. See BILLS, supra note 49, at 47–55 (suggesting that one way to think
about credentialism is as a “sheepskin effect,” which is defined as a
“disproportionately large increase[] in returns to schooling after the completion of
certain years that usually entail[s] a degree”).
70. See Buon & Compton, supra note 44, at 130 – 31 (arguing that criteria
such as behavior, skill, knowledge, and attitude are far better indicators of future
job performance than credentials, “which may have some limited relevance to the
job”).
71. See Brown, supra note 44, at 1.
72. Id.
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credentialing seeks to understand the concept within the broader
context of economic, social, and cultural themes.73
Unfortunately, the sociological literature provides relatively
little description of what makes a credential a good source of
information. Some of this thinness may be due to the underlying
disagreement over the value of education itself—specifically,
whether it increases productivity or not.74 The credentialing
literature also tends to focus on the dark underside of credentials,
looking for worms under the stone rather than trying to figure out
why the stone was so heavy and hard to move in the first place.75
Although there seems to be no one accepted definition of what
distinguishes a high-quality credential from one that is not, the
literature does offer a few hints. One aspect of the informational
value of a credential lies in the legitimacy of the issuer.76 The
greater the perceived legitimacy of the issuer to the audience, the
greater the value of the credential.77 A degree from Harvard may
have carried great weight among Boston employers in the 1930s;
it carried much less weight among farmers in the dustbowl.78 The
greater the perceived legitimacy of the issuer—and the broader
that perception—the higher the value of the credential.79
A second aspect lies in the ability of the audience to
understand what the credential stands for—in other words, to
comprehend the meaning of the credential, both in terms of its
substantive requirements and as an abstraction.80 What is the
attribute that it is standing for, or the experience that one has
73. See id.
74. See id. at 2.
75. Infra Part VI.
76. See BILLS, supra note 49, at 49 – 50 (discussing the differences between
credentials issued via accreditation, certification, and licensing).
77. See id. at 50 (noting that licensing is the most restrictive form of
occupation regulation and that licenses are therefore some of the most valuable
credentials).
78. See JONATHAN RABAN, BAD LAND: AN AMERICAN ROMANCE 217 – 40 (1996)
(describing the plight of homesteaders during the “Dirty Thirties”).
79. See BILLS, supra note 65, at 50 (explaining that licenses are considered
more valuable than certificates because licensing is a more restrictive form of
occupational regulation than certification).
80. See Brown & Bills, supra note 49, at 134 (explaining the abstractions
associated with credentials are created for various social purposes).
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undergone?81 For a credential to function, the observers of the
credential—the recipients of the information—must recognize it as
meaning something.82 Some credentials, such as a high school
diploma, may have a widely accepted meaning; others, such as
digital badges, may only have meaning to certain communities.83
A third aspect of the value of a credential lies in the audience’s
need to rely on the credential rather than direct observation of the
attribute or experience.84 After all, if the audience can directly
observe the relevant characteristic, behavior, or experience, it has
no need for a credential.85
In summary, the interrelationship of three aspects allows
credentials to enable trusting relationships where uncertainty
would otherwise exist: (1) the ability of the credential to abstract
81. See id. (“Cultural meanings make differences that matter. Credentials
may connote different meanings to social actors of all sorts.”). David Salomon
explains:
The key to compressing data is the distinction between data and
information. Data is how information is represented; it is the physical
embodiment of the information. We know that it is possible to use
different amounts of data to convey the same information. A good
example is a story. A novel that originally occupies 300 pages can be
“digested” and compressed to just 30 pages without losing the main
outlines of the plot. The same story may be told by one person in 2000
words and by another in 200 words because the former employs
unnecessary (or irrelevant) words, thus introducing redundancy into
his narrative, while the latter selects only those words that are strictly
needed.
SALOMON, supra note 54, at 5. Of course, information is necessarily lost during
this process. For example, while it may be possible to summarize the plot,
characters, and symbols of George Orwell’s 1984 in a much shorter pamphlet, one
might argue that much of its communicative content is lost in that compression.
See generally GILBERT BORMAN & FRANK H. THOMPSON JR., CLIFFSNOTES ON
ORWELL’S 1984 (1st ed. 1967) (presenting an abridged version of George Orwell’s
1984 in pamphlet format).
82. See Grant, supra note 53, at 97–114.
83. See id.
84. See id.; Brown, supra note 44 (“Credential use arises where, for any of a
variety of structural reasons, a party cannot easily judge for itself on the
substantive uncertainties attendant upon social transactions.”); Brown, supra
note 43, at 26 (“Credentials abstract qualities that are held to persist over time,
so that substantive inquiry about the retention of knowledge can also be set
aside.”).
85. See NOCK, supra note 53, at 43–44 (arguing that society relies on
reputations to justify trust).
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or compress information about a characteristic or experience,
(2) the need of the audience to rely on a credential rather than
direct observation of that characteristic or experience, and (3) the
legitimacy of the issuer in determining whether that credential is
deserved.
These three criteria, together with the broader social meaning
of patents, provide the analytical framework for our examination
of patents as credentials.
III. Patents and Their Requirements
The basic concept of a patent is likely familiar to any modern
reader. In simplest terms, a patent is a set of exclusive rights
granted to an inventor in return for publicly disclosing an
invention.86 Patent rights are created by the law of individual
nations.87 Although treaties exist that harmonize the basic
requirements to obtain a patent, there is no “worldwide patent.”88
In the United States, the authority to issue patents is established
by the federal Constitution.89 It grants Congress the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”90

86. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS OV-2 (2010) (“A patent
confers the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed
invention in the United States for a term of 17 years from the issue date.”).
87. See id. (explaining how the Constitution empowered Congress to
establish a national patent system in the United States).
88. For example, an inventor may obtain a patent in the United States, a
patent in Canada, and a patent in Brazil. While there is a near-universal
application mechanism called a PCT application, and several treaties that
harmonize the substantive law of the member states, there is no serious current
move toward creating a worldwide patent. See Katrina McClatchey, The
European Patent Office and the European Patent: An Open Avenue for
Biotechnologists and “Living Inventions”, 2 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 25, 25 (2004) (“[A]
patent only offers protection within the territorial boundaries of the country that
grants the inventor the patent. In other words, there is no such thing as a
‘worldwide’ patent. Therefore, an inventor must file for and obtain a patent in
each country where protection is desired.”).
89. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
90. Id.
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Much has been written about the history of the patent system:
how it came to be, how it evolved and changed over the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, and how patent law changed during that
time.91 Suffice it to say that patents in the United States are as old
as the nation.92 The first patent law was passed on April 10, 1790;93
the first patent issued three months later.94 For most of their
existence, U.S. patents have been examined and issued by a Patent
Office, an agency of the federal government.95 While the look of
patents has changed over the past two centuries, the core idea—an
exclusive right to an invention granted in exchange for revealing
how to make and use that invention—has remained the same.96
Today, patents are issued by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, an agency of the Department of Commerce.97
Each has historically come bearing a gold seal and red ribbon, and

91. See generally BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1 (examining the legal battles
surrounding Alexander Graham Bell’s telephone patent); KENNETH W. DOBYNS,
THE PATENT OFFICE PONY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY PATENT OFFICE (1994)
(describing the patent system to the end of the nineteenth century); B. ZORINA
KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN
AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920 (2005) (explaining that,
historically, the democratic market-orientation of the United States has ensured
that patent institutions were calibrated to accommodate changes affecting private
and social costs and benefits). For numerous secondary historical sources on
patents, patent law, and the patent system, see BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at
215 – 60.
92. See CHISUM, supra note 86, at OV-3 (noting that Congress enacted the
first patent statute in 1790).
93. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (repealed 1793).
94. U.S. Patent No. X00001 (issued July 31, 1790).
95. Technically, modern patents are issued by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office. As this Article is focused on the patent side of things, for
stylistic reasons “Patent Office” is used.
96. See CHISUM, supra note 86, at OV-3 (explaining that the 1790 and 1793
patent statutes introduced the fundamental concepts, such as “useful art” and
“new and useful improvement thereon,” that remain features of United States
patent law today).
97. See About Us, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/about-us (last visited
February 19, 2019) (“The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
is the federal agency for granting U.S. patents and registering trademarks.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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is signed by the Director of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.98

Figure 1: Pre-2018 Cover of a patent.99

98. See, e.g., Janet E. Reed, Publishing and Patenting the Fruits of Academic
Research: The Key to a Successful Parallel Track, 14 NATURE IMMUNOLOGY 523,
524 (2013) (providing an image of the cover of a patent). In 2018, the USPTO
released a new version of the patent cover: the ribbon is gone but the seal remains.
See USPTO Unveils New Patent Cover Design at South by Southwest (SXSW),
USPTO (MAR. 11, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/usptounveils-new-patent-cover-design-south-southwest-sxsw (last visited Feb. 19,
2019) (“This new design portrays a modern day flair while reflecting the history
of patent covers by taking design cues from 19th and early 20th century patent
cover designs, mostly through the use of script typography and graphic
ornaments.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
99. Image
of
Cover
of
a
Patent,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:US_Patent_cover.jpg (last visited Feb.
19, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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The following Parts briefly describe the substantive criteria
and process for obtaining a patent. While we recognize that most
members of society at large—the receivers of the
credential—might not know the patent system at this level of
detail, we nonetheless think it is important to describe these
criteria so as to weigh the normative value of patents as
credentials later on. In other words, if the process is not any good,
then we should be skeptical of the credential; if the process seems
sound, the credential’s value is more legitimate.100
A. The Criteria for Obtaining a Patent
1. The Invention
Beginning with the first Patent Act in 1790,101 Congress drew
on its Constitutional power to authorize the issuance of patents
provided that the application met substantive criteria set out by
statute.102 Over time, the statutory requirements for obtaining a
patent have evolved, but the core criteria—appropriate subject
matter, usefulness, newness, and adequacy of disclosure—have
remained the same.103
The threshold question of what subject matter is eligible for a
patent is a surprisingly opaque topic, at least at the legal margins.
Indeed, if one were to ask a dozen people on the street about what
kind of “stuff” is eligible for a patent, one would likely get a more
definite perspective than the legal meaning of “patent eligible
subject matter.” Courts and commentators have vigorously
100. Infra Part II.
101. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (repealed 1793).
102. See id. (requiring submission of a writing that distinguishes the
invention from prior inventions and enables the public to understand the
mechanics behind the invention).
103. Compare id. (“[G]rantee . . . of each patent shall . . . deliver . . . a
specification in writing . . . which specification shall be so particular . . . as not
only to distinguish the invention . . . but also to enable [another] . . . to
make . . . the same . . . that the public may have the full benefit . . . after the
expiration of the patent term . . . .”), with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
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debated the boundaries of patentable subject matter in recent
years and a framework for analyzing disputes is slowly beginning
to emerge.104 Historically, however, five broadly defined categories
have long stood as the “types” of subject matter that are
appropriate for patents: machines, manufactures, compositions of
matter, processes and improvements thereto.105 We can loosely
refer to these as “inventions,” subject to the additional
requirements below.
To be patentable, an invention must be new.106 “New” means
that an invention must be both novel, that is, not previously
disclosed or placed on sale,107 and nonobvious, that is, a patent may
not be obtained “if the differences between the claimed invention
and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole
would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
104. See, e.g., Ted G. Dane, Are the Federal Circuit’s Recent Section 101
Decisions a “Specific Improvement” in Patent Eligibility Law, 26 FED. CIR. B.J.
331, 375 – 77 (describing the post-Alice landscape of Federal Circuit jurisprudence
and proposing possible improvements).
105. See ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING
§ 1 – 4 (6th ed., 2013) (describing the classes of inventions that may be patented
and summarizing recent developments regarding eligible subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
107. See id. (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the claimed
invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on
sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention.”). Until recently, patent law operated under a system whereby
prior invention by another could defeat an inventor’s claim to a patent. See Lee
Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, Jay P. Kesan, Debate, America Invents, More or
Less?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 229, 230 (2012) (“For over two hundred
years, American patent law has given priority of right to those who were first in
time to an invention.”). The 2011 America Invents Act changed the framework
from a “first to invent” system to a “first to file” system. See id. at 230 – 31 (“The
best empirical study, which analyzed similar changes in the Canadian patent
system and enjoys considerable theoretical support, indicates that such a change
may discourage small inventors from inventing and innovating.” (citing David S.
Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Priority Rules: An Empirical Exploration of
First-to-Invent Versus First-to-File (Univ. of Pa., Inst. for Law & Econ. Research
Paper No. 11-29, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883821)). Despite the change,
a patent may still only be awarded for an invention that has not previously been
disclosed. See id. at 246 (“The AIA-imposed system is not a first-to-file system like
that used in other parts of the world. It is more technically a first-to-file or
first-to-publicly-disclose system.”).
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which the claimed invention pertains.”108 In most cases, novelty or
nonobviousness is at issue.109
A patentable invention must also be “useful.”110 Court
decisions discuss how a proffered invention must be both
“operable” and possess “practical” or “real world” utility, which is
sometimes defined as meaning a “specific and substantial
utility.”111
In
two
areas—biotechnology
and
chemical
compounds—practical utility is taken quite seriously.112 Outside
those two areas, however, the usefulness requirement is more of a
threshold consideration than a significant barrier to
patentability.113 Notably, “practical” utility under current doctrine
can be purely communicative.114
The final requirement of patentability is that of sufficient
disclosure.115 The patent’s disclosure serves two purposes. First, it
108. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
109. See CHISUM, supra note 86, § 5.07 (summarizing decisions involving
nonobviousness); accord Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness
Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 15 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 729– 30 (2013)
(finding 389 judicial opinions of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals that involved
nonobviousness determinations in the ten years before the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in KSR v. Teleflex and the five years after its decision).
110. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112.
111. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“An asserted use
must show that the claimed invention has a significant and presently available
benefit to the public” and “must also show that that claimed invention can be used
to provide a well-defined and particular benefit to the public.”).
112. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY 223 – 54 (7th ed. 2017) (discussing utility in the biotechnology and chemical
context); MUELLER, supra note 110, at 235 (“The utility disputes that do arise tend
to involve inventions in the chemical and biotechnological arts.”).
113. See MUELLER, supra note 110, at 235 (“In contrast with the novelty and
nonobviousness requirements . . . the substantive threshold for satisfying the
utility requirement is relatively low.”).
114. An example offered in Janice Mueller’s influential patent law handbook
is that of a patent for a “Hat Simulating a Fried Egg,” useful “as an
attention-getting item in connection with promotional activities at trade shows,
conventions and the like.” Id. at 236– 38 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,457,821).
Mueller further observes that “[t]his is more than sufficient to satisfy the utility
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101.” Id. at 238.
115. See Jason Rantanen, Patent Law’s Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 369, 370 (2013) (“Whether it be through doctrinal mechanisms such as
enablement or written description, or through other articulations, providing
information about the invention in the patent document itself is a foundational
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allows the public to learn about the invention, to replicate it, to
improve on it, and to avoid granting future patents on it.116 Second,
it limits the maximum scope of patent claims by tethering the
inventor to what was actually disclosed at the time of the
application.117 In other words, for purposes of patent law, an
inventor is treated as if she invented only what is disclosed in the
patent document itself.118 While patent law allows the exclusive
right of a patent to extend to some degree beyond what is disclosed,
the disclosure provides an anchor for the inventor’s claim.119
2. The Inventor
In addition to disclosing an invention, every patent must name
the inventor or inventors.120 While firms often file for patents on
component of a patent system, a basic axis of patentability.”).
116. See id. at 373 (using the example of an inventor’s four-legged chair to
explain that “a robust disclosure requirement would allow others not just to
reproduce the applicant’s four-legged chair, but perhaps to develop three-legged
chairs, or chairs that fold, or chairs with little writing surfaces attached to them”).
117. See Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 895, 924 (describing the disclosure requirement as the “main patent law
mechanism that ties the underlying invention to the scope of exclusive rights”).
118. See id. at 927 (“Simply put, there is no doctrine in patent law that tightly
limits the inventor’s rights to precisely what she disclosed; at best, there is a
bungee cord. One must still stay within the ballpark of the technology, but where
in the ballpark tends to be the important question.”).
119. See id. at 926 (explaining that “the point is that the law on enablement
and written description permits claiming beyond what is contained in the patent’s
technological disclosure”).
120. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (stating that “[w]hoever invents or
discovers . . . may obtain a patent therefor”); id. § 111 (“An application for patent
shall be made, or authorized to be made, by the inventor, except as otherwise
provided in this title, in writing to the Director.”); id. § 115 (“An application for
patent that is filed under section 111(a) or commences the national stage under
section 371 shall include, or be amended to include, the name of the inventor for
any invention claimed in the application.”). Prior to the 2011 America Invents
Act, the inventorship requirement was also codified at § 102(f). 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)
(2008) (“[A] person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . he did not himself
invent the subject matter sought to be patented.”); see also Dennis Crouch, With
102(f) Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified in 35 U.S.C. 101? Maybe, but Not
Restrictions on Patenting Obvious Variants of Derived Information, PATENTLYO
(Oct. 4, 2012), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/with-102f-eliminated-isinventorship-now-codified-in-35-usc-101.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2019)
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behalf of their employees, and may have legal title to the patent,
only individuals—human beings —may be named as inventors.121
The identity of the inventors named on a patent is a
determination of law.122 Although, as with any legal question, the
facts matter.123 A key element of the analysis is what the invention
is; the answer, as with many parts of patent law, is the claims. One
treatise on patent drafting explains: “The starting point for
determining inventorship is to define the invention. Until it has
been determined what is to be claimed and how that distinguishes
over the prior art, it may not be possible to actually identify the
inventors.”124
Inventorship turns on who the invention originated
with—that is, who “conceived” of the invention.125 Only a person
(explaining the various views regarding the “real ongoing questions that stem
from the elimination of section 102(f)”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Note that a patent may be assigned or licensed—ownership is a separate
issue from inventorship. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
121. 35 U.S.C. § 100 defines an inventor as “the individual or, if a joint
invention, the individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject
matter of the invention.” The common legal meaning of “individual” is “a private
or natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or
association.” Individual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). See also Ryan
Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent
Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1092– 93 (2016) (discussing the legal requirements of
an invention). Historically, only human beings have been named as inventors on
patents in the United States. See ALAN J. KASPER ET AL., PATENTS AFTER THE AIA:
EVOLVING LAW AND PRACTICE, 7-7 to 7-9, 7-13 (discussing the requirement that a
human being be listed as an inventor even though in practice the patent may be
assigned to a business entity); see also Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
zu Forderung der Wissenschaften E.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“To
perform this mental act, inventors must be natural persons and cannot be
corporations or sovereigns.”).
122. See, e.g., Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A., Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (stating that “[i]nventorship is a question of law, which we review
without deference”).
123. See id. (observing also that “a party alleging non-joinder [on the patent]
‘must meet the heavy burden of proving its case by clear and convincing evidence’”
(quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
124. JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION § 4:3 (2d ed.
2014).
125. See Univ. of Utah, 734 F.3d at 1323 (“It is axiomatic that inventors are
the individuals that conceive of the invention: ‘Conception is the touchstone of
inventorship . . . ’” (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d
1223, 1227– 28 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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who has contributed to the conception of the claimed invention
may be named as an inventor.126 “Conception,” in turn, refers to
the mental aspect of the inventing process—“the formation in the
mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the
complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied
in practice.”127 In other words, merely thinking of a general idea is
not enough.
Although there are sometimes hard questions in patent law
when it comes to the identity of joint inventors, patent law
theoretically allows for little flexibility in their identification.128
The general rule is that each named inventor must have
contributed to the conception of the invention, as defined by the
claims, and all those who participated in the conception of the
invention must be named.129 While that contribution may not be
“insignificant in quality, when that contribution is measured
against the dimension of the full invention,” inventors are named
for entire patents, not just for a single claim.130 Since patents have
multiple claims, and contribution to only one claim (or a part of a
claim) is all that is necessary to be an inventor on the patent, an
“inventor” on a patent may be a person who conceived of the most
“inventive” aspect or a person who conceived of a relatively minor
component.131 In the eyes of the law, both are inventors.

126. See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 86, § 2.01, at 2–3 (stating that the
requirement for inventorship “bars issuance of a patent for a conception derived
from any source or person other than the person or persons named as the
inventorship entity”).
127. Univ. of Utah, 734 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr
Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227– 28 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
128. See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 86, § 2.02, at 2–7 (“It is frequently difficult
to determine who has in fact contributed to the conception of a given invention
because the contribution must consist of more than suggesting a desired result or
following instructions of another.”).
129. See Bd. of Trs. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 563 U.S. 776, 785 (2011)
(“[P]recedents confirm the general rule that rights in an invention belong to the
inventor.”).
130. Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A., Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (quoting Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
131. See Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“[A] co-inventor need not make a contribution to every claim of a patent.”).
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B. The Process of Obtaining a Patent

The initial step in the process of obtaining of a patent—called
“patent prosecution”—is drafting a patent application.132 The
application must include, among other things, a description of the
invention and a claim or claims.133 The claims are a critical part of
the patent application because they demarcate the boundaries of
what the inventor is claiming she invented.134 After the inventor is
satisfied with the content of her application she sends it to the
Patent Office along with a filing fee.135 As of September 2018 the
average wait time between filing an application and receiving an
initial response from the examiner assigned to the application was
about 16 months.136
After reviewing the application, the examiner will typically
issue an “office action” containing the examiner’s decision on
whether to allow the claims.137 If the claims are rejected, the Office
Action specifies why they are not being allowed.138 An examiner’s
rejection can be based on overbroad claims, a defective
132. See MUELLER, supra note 110, at 42 (describing patent prosecution as
“the process of preparing and filing a patent application . . . and thereafter
interacting with the agency in order to obtain a U.S. patent” which “typically
involves a multi-year negotiation”).
133. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.51 (2013) (providing a list of requirements for a patent
application).
134. See Brian Farkas, Just How Broad Will My Patent Protection Be?, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/just-how-broad-will-my-patentprotection-be.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (“Patent claims establish the
boundaries or scope of an invention. They are the standard by which patent rights
are measured.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
135. See USPTO Fee Schedule, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/learning-andresources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule (last updated Oct. 1, 2018) (last
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing the various charges associated with patent filings)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Note that all individual
inventors qualify for a discounted rate as “small entities” under 37 C.F.R § 1.27
(2018) and some qualify for a further discount as “micro entities” under 37 C.F.R
§ 1.29 (2018).
136. Data Visualization Center: February 2019 Patents Data, at a Glance,
USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last visited
Mar. 10, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
137. See DAVID PRESSMAN, PATENT IT YOURSELF 340 (15th ed. 2011)
(explaining that the “first Office Action” (OA) . . . consists of forms and a letter
from the examiner in charge of your application”).
138. See id. (stating that an application will rarely be allowed in the first OA).
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specification, prior art that the examiner has identified to show the
invention is not novel or nonobvious, or “various other
objections.”139 The inventor or her attorney will respond to the
office action by amending claims to satisfy the examiner or arguing
that the examiner has misunderstood or misconstrued a piece of
prior art.140 Once the inventor has responded to the first office
action she can expect to wait another several months for a
response.141 This process can go on until the examiner allows the
claims, the applicant gives up, or the applicant appeals.142 On
average the entire prosecution process, from filing to patent grant,
takes about 24 months.143
IV. Patents as Credentials
The core thesis of this Article is that patents are
credentials—formal abstractions of a person’s inventive nature.
Underlying patents as a credential are intertwined notions of
artificiality and reality. Patents provide a reputational effect
because they are defined units that distill a person’s life
experiences into a quantifiable form. The reputational effect of
patents, then, turns on two aspects: society’s general perception of
patents and the formal mechanisms that authenticate the
credential.144
This Part begins with an examination of the social meaning of
a patent. Just as a PhD or an award for philanthropy says
something about the recipient, so too does society perceive patents
as saying something about the persons named on them as
inventors. We then construct the idea of patents as credentials in
formal terms: the legitimacy of the issuer, the informational
content of the credential itself, and the need of the audience to rely
139. Id.
140. See id. at 341 (“Your response must take whatever action is necessary to
overcome the objections and rejections listed in the OA.”).
141. See id. (“About two to six months after you file your first amendment,
you’ll receive a second OA from the PTO . . . .”).
142. See id. at 398 (summarizing the many steps that might be necessary
during the application prosecution process).
143. Data Visualization Center, supra note 136.
144. Supra Part II.
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on a patent rather than a direct examination of the underlying
evidence of invention.
A. The Social Meaning of a Patent
A salient aspect of patents is the near-universal core meaning
ascribed to them.145 Patents are widely associated with invention,
new technological developments, and breakthroughs.146 They
represent practical innovation rather than scientific discoveries or
creative expression.147 Obtaining a patent means that the subject
matter described therein is an invention; that it is something
useful, novel, and nonobvious that its creator has given to the
public.148 Only an invention is deserving of a patent, and one who
obtains a patent is thus an inventor.149 Or in Carolyn Cooper’s
words, “Of course, we recognize that not all inventions received
patents. Still, all patents were, by definition, for inventions.”150
A full exploration of the social meaning of patents—and of
what it means to be an inventor—deserves a much more extensive
treatment than is possible in this Article.151 It would be foolish to
145. See JOSEPH ROSSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INVENTOR 235 (1931) (“[I]n
spite of the fact that it is very difficult to define invention, the average college
group has a very definite conception of invention which agrees very remarkably
with the views of the Court . . . .”).
146. See id. at 9 (“The outstanding feature of all inventions is that they give
something which has not existed before.”).
147. See, e.g., Pamela O. Long, Invention, Authorship, “Intellectual Property,”
and the Origin of Patents: Notes Toward a Conceptual History, 32 TECH. &
CULTURE 846, 848 (1991) (“The positive valuation of craft knowledge and material
invention is a basic precondition for the development of intellectual property
attitudes with regard to them.”).
148. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
149. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
150. Carolyn C. Cooper, Social Construction of Invention through Patent
Management: Thomas Blanchard’s Woodworking Machinery, 32 TECH. &
CULTURE 960, 960 (1991).
151. For examples of historical works on inventors, see generally BEAUCHAMP,
supra note 1; HAROLD EVANS, THEY MADE AMERICA (2004); FREEBERG, supra note
33; CHRISTINE MACLEOD, HEROES OF INVENTION: TECHNOLOGY, LIBERALISM AND
BRITISH IDENTITY, 1750–1914 (2007); DAVID G. MCCULLOUGH, THE WRIGHT
BROTHERS (2015). Less directly studied is the social meaning of patents. See
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 6 (“[T]he historical law of patents remains in many
ways unmapped, and its connection to the broader setting of legal and political
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pretend that the only social meaning of patents is the one described
below; the idea of patents is hardly linked solely to the glory of
invention. A theme throughout American history and before is that
of patents as oppressive tools of big business.152 Herbert
Hovenkamp, Oren Bracha, and many others have written about
the role of patents as tools of monopolists.153 There are the sewing
machine patent wars,154 the litigation explosions,155 and, of course,
the patent trolls.156
That said, a consistent theme that emerges from the use of
patents in society is that while there are variations in societal
views of patents—and sometimes tensions with those
variations—there is nonetheless a powerful core, one that
stretches across individual facts and circumstances and typically
emerges dominant among other themes: that of the patent as
identifying an invention, created by an inventor.157 With that in
mind, a few examples will suffice to establish that society
understands that a patent identifies an invention; that it is a proxy
for practical innovation conceived by a human; and that patent
institutions unclear.”).
152. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 112, at 12.
153. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW:
NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 188–204 (2015) (describing
historical development of and laws related to intellectual property monopolies);
OREN BRACHA, OWNING IDEAS: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1790– 1909, at 273 – 84 (2016) (describing the way in
which patents were used as a tool by business leaders who were pursuing
economic stabilization and corporate stability).
154. See Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent
Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 168 (2011)
(“The sewing machine was the result of numerous incremental and
complementary inventive contributions, which led to a morass of patent
infringement litigation given overlapping patent claims to the final commercial
product.”).
155. See Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125
YALE L.J. 848, 848 (2016) (stating that “at its height, the litigation explosion
produced a political backlash that threatened to sweep away the patent system
as we know it”).
156. See BRACHA, supra note 153, at 315 (“The resurgence of various
industrial strategies for the use of patents gave rise to new discontent over ‘patent
thickets’ and ‘patent trolls,’ not unlike the older ones.”).
157. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 110, at 1 (describing patents as “a
powerful form of IP protection that conveys the right to exclude all others from
unauthorized imitation or use of a patented invention”).
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inventors are held up as occupying a special place in the
advancement of the Republic.158
From the earliest days of the young United States, patents
were associated with inventions and practical innovation.159 One
of the first new laws passed by Congress was the Patent Act of
1790, which authorized the grant of patents to those persons who
“invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine,
machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known
or used . . . .”160 In other words, an invention.
Patent law treatises, unsurprisingly, drew a close link
between patent and invention. Walker on Patents, a prominent
nineteenth century treatise, observed that “patents are grantable
for nothing but inventions. It is also the law that they can be
granted only to those who invented the inventions they
respectively cover, or to the assignees or legal representatives of
those persons.”161 And, in the author’s view, patent inventors were
quite special indeed.
The right of property which an inventor has in his invention, is
excelled in point of dignity, by no other property right whatever.
It is equalled in point of dignity, only by the rights which
authors have in their copyrighted books. The inventor is not the
pampered favorite or beneficiary of the government, or of the
nation. The benefits which he confers, are greater than those
which he receives . . . . Their labor is the most dignified and the
most honorable of all labor; and the resulting property is most
perfectly theirs.162

An emerging periodical literature during the nineteenth
century further illustrates the early days of the American public’s
158. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 150, at 960–61 (“He was able to make a
career of inventing because the society in which he lived—the 19th-century
United States—gave him material reward as well as fame for his acts of
invention . . . From this we can infer that these societies have generally approved
of invention and intended to encourage it.”).
159. Note that “patents” have a long history prior to the creation of the United
States, and not one necessarily confined to technological innovation. For a history
of patent law see, for example, BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 13 – 34; MERGES &
DUFFY, supra note 112, at 3– 19.
160. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (repealed 1793).
161. ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS § 44, at 31 (1883).
162. Id. § 152, at 102– 03.
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link between patents, inventors and invention.163 Scientific
American, launched in 1845, provides a particularly prominent
example.164 Patents played a major role in Scientific American
where patent lists constituted a “chief feature” during the
nineteenth century.165 But nineteenth century periodicals that
focused on patents and inventions were hardly limited to Scientific
American, as Frank Luther Mott observed; this period was one of
“amazing fecundity in invention,” in which “a number of
periodicals were devoted to mechanics and patents.”166 Each of
these periodicals placed inventors, and their patents, up on high.
From these nineteenth century beginnings emerged an
understanding of patents as defining what was an invention.
Steven Lubar writes about the early years of the patent system, a
period in which inventors “bemoaned the lack of enthusiasm for
invention” and “complained bitterly about the patent system and
about the public’s low regard for patents and patentees.”167 As the
nineteenth century progressed, however, Americans came to
believe that technological advances were central to American
economic success.168 With that changing belief came a sharper
focus on the role of the patent system. Great courtroom battles and
Supreme Court debates took place, from the arguments of Daniel
163. For example, the first issue of Scientific American, published in 1845,
contained a list of agricultural patents issued in 1844; subsequent issues reported
in more depth on recently patented inventions. See, e.g., Recent Inventions, 45 SCI.
AM. 416, 418 (1881) (reporting on recent inventions and describing their
usefulness).
164. See FRANK LUTHER MOTT, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MAGAZINES, VOLUME
II: 1850–1865, at 316–24 (1938) (describing the development of Scientific
American and the way it “had a significance—at least for its first sixty or seventy
years — unapproached in kind and effect by any other periodical”).
165. Id. at 323. Mott observes that Scientific American’s focus on patents
began to dwindle in the twentieth century, and its scope broadened to focus on
popular science generally. It is also worth noting that practitioners of patent law
had a supporting interest in Scientific American. See BRACHA, supra note 153, at
212–13 (noting that “[t]he science and technology magazine that was launched in
1845 was owned by the Munn & Co. patent agency”).
166. MOTT, supra note 164, at 80.
167. Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 32 TECH.
& CULTURE 932, 936 (1991).
168. See FREEBERG, supra note 33, at 140 (describing the “new aristocracy of
practical intellect”); id. at 158 (“In the late nineteenth century, Americans read
accounts of new inventions in almost every issue of their newspapers.”).
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Webster against those of Rufus Choate in “The Great India Rubber
Case”169 to the Telephone Cases170 culminating in a Supreme Court
opinion that takes up an entire volume of the United States
Reporter.171 Throughout this period of technological ascendency,
patents and inventions were tightly intertwined172—so much so
that Joseph Rossman, Chemical Engineer, Patent Examiner, and
Editor of the Journal of the Patent Office Society, began his 1931
book The Psychology of the Inventor with a tribute to inventors,
inventions and patents:
The profound alteration in our physical environment, especially
during the last hundred years, has been effected to a large
extent by our inventors. It is generally acknowledged that the
entire progress of the human race from primitive times to its
present level has been made possible by the inventor of physical
devices. As an innovator and leader, the inventor performs one
of the most important functions in society, for he holds the key
to further progress.173

There is a strong argument that the modern concept of
invention itself was constructed through patent law, much of it
during the nineteenth century.174 Historian Carolyn C. Cooper, for
example, uses the story of Thomas Blanchard’s woodworking

169. See Lubar, supra note 167, at 956 (describing that the case “held the
attention of inventors not only because of its importance for patent law but also
as a courtroom drama”).
170. Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
171. See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 58 (describing the many ways the
Telephone Cases was “legally and commercially momentous”).
172. For examples of historical scholarship that closely associates invention
and patents, see generally BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1; FREEBERG, supra note 33;
Long, supra note 147; Lubar, supra note 167.
173. ROSSMAN, supra note 145, at v.
174. Like every concept, the notion of “invention” can be traced yet further
backward; in this case, finding predicate steps in the development of Western
notions of individuality, authorship, and medieval urbanism. See, e.g., Long,
supra note 147, at 869–70 (“Medieval cities and the market economies that
developed within and among them provided the essential context for the
emergence of a fully developed concept of intellectual property.”). See generally
SCIENTIFIC AUTHORSHIP: CREDIT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN SCIENCE (Mario
Biagioli & Peter Galison, eds., 2003) (exploring the development of scientific
authorship throughout history).
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machinery to illustrate how the meaning of invention was
constructed both in individual cases and more broadly.
Invention in the United States in the 19th century was to a
significant degree socially constructed through patent
management. By social construction of invention I mean not
only the social shaping of specific inventions but also, at a
deeper level, the determining of the very rules by which people
defined ‘newness’ in inventions. Since originality is the defining
characteristic of any invention, the gradual social formation of
decision rules for originality was tantamount to defining
invention itself.175

Making a similar claim, Christopher Beauchamp writes, “The
popular and scholarly literature about who ‘really’ invented the
telephone misses a broader point: that the question itself is a legal
artifact.”176 Fundamentally,
“Who invented the telephone?” was a question defined by law.
Legal rules shaped not only the standards of proof but also the
terms of inquiry: defining what it meant to be a first and true
inventor and prescribing the ways that a would-be great
inventor needed to describe his achievements in order to gain a
patent of maximum breadth.177

Ultimately, it was the patent that defined the inventor of these
revolutionary new technologies.
By the middle of the twentieth century the notion of “inventor”
as exceptional, and its linkage to patents, was strongly engrained
within the popular psyche, as Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion
from Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
Corp.178 illustrates:
The invention, to justify a patent, had to serve the ends of
science—to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and
the like; to make a distinctive contribution to scientific

175. Cooper, supra note 150, at 960.
176. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 4; see also Kara Swanson, ‘Great Men,’ Law,
and the Social Construction of Technology, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1093, 1097–98
(2018) (reviewing BEAUCHAMP and examining the complex nature of
inventor-myth stories).
177. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 5.
178. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
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knowledge. That is why through the years the opinions of the
Court commonly have taken “inventive genius” as the test.179

Justice Douglas’s concurrence demonstrates both the
idealistic view of patents as only available for great, pioneering
inventions, and the less laudatory view (in his eyes) that patents
were being issued for “gadgets,” the work of a mere mechanic.180
Yet, inherent in both views is the idea of the patent-holding
inventor as a person who makes new combinations and devices,
whether they be paradigm-shifting or modestly new and useful
improvements.181
Popular culture often draws upon the shared social meaning
of patents as associated with, or reflecting, invention. Thus, the
first official thing that Mark Twain’s engineer-narrator in A
Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court did upon becoming the
chief minister was “to start a patent office; for I knew that a
country without a patent office and good patent laws was just a
crab, and couldn’t travel any way but sideways or backways.”182
The use of patents in popular media highlights the strength
and acceptance of their core meaning.183 Popular media sometimes
employs jokes that revolve around patents or constructs absurd
plots involving patents.184 While these portrayals are sometimes
179. Id. at 154 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Cuno Eng’g Corp. v.
Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) (“[T]he new device, however
useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius not merely the skill of
the calling.”).
180. See Great Atlantic, 340 U.S. at 155 (“The Constitution never sanctioned
the patenting of gadgets. Patents serve a higher end—the advancement of
science. . . . [I]t has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the
scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.”).
181. Christopher Beauchamp offers another example of the linkage between
patent and invention during the first half of the twentieth century in his
description of the 1936 centennial of the U.S. Patent Office, in which speakers
“lauded the leading inventions of the day and celebrated a patent system that had
‘served as a model for the world and made possible unified, coordinated progress
toward happier living for all peoples.’” BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 205.
182. MARK TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR’S COURT 107
(1996).
183. For a comprehensive survey of patent attorneys in mass entertainment
forms of popular media, see generally Robert M. Jarvis, The Patent Attorney in
Popular Culture, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 469 (2016).
184. For an example of humor and patents, see The Big Bang Theory: The
Application Deterioration (Chuck Lorre Productions broadcast Mar. 10, 2016), in
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inaccurate,185 the jokes and plots wouldn’t work if there weren’t a
strong social understanding of the connection between patents and
invention. Thus, the episode of The Simpsons in which Homer
Simpson takes up inventing and ultimately develops a
patent-worthy invention is funny in part precisely because Homer
is not what society would consider an “inventor” and his
“invention”—an automatic hammer—does not serve to change this
perception.186
The social link between invention and patents has hardly gone
unnoticed by legal scholars. Mark Lemley’s article The Myth of the
Sole Inventor is premised on the idea that there is a widely held
belief in the “individual inventor” idea.187 “Any elementary school
student can recite a number of canonical American invention
stories. . . . Patent law is built around these canonical tales.”188
Indeed, “the very theory of patent law is based on the idea that a
lone genius can solve problems that stump the experts, and that
the lone genius will do so only if properly incented by the lure of a
patent.”189 Embracing the idea of myth, Dan Burk describes the
symbolic function of patents for businesses: “acquisition of patents
appears strongly ceremonial, demonstrating organizational
adherence to prevalent narratives of innovation, competition, and
success.”190 And in Inventing Norms, Will Hubbard describes ways
in which patent law shapes social norms about invention, such as
which three of the principal characters conceive of an invention and seek to patent
it.
185. See James Daily, Orphan Black, L. & MULTIVERSE (May 1, 2014),
http://lawandthemultiverse.com/2014/05/01/orphan-black/#more-2592
(last
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (discussing the use of patents in the television series
Orphan Black) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
186. The Simpsons: The Wizard of Evergreen Terrace (Fox Network broadcast
Sept. 20, 1998).
187. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV.
709, 709 (2012) (“The theory of patent law is based on the idea that a lone genius
can solve problems that stump the experts, and that the lone genius will do so
only if properly incented. But the canonical story of the lone genius inventor is
largely a myth.”).
188. Id. at 710.
189. Id.; see also Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual
Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 323– 27 (2008) (describing the “origin myth”
of patent law).
190. Burk, supra note 5, at 442.
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by “identifying meaningful inventions” or helping to “ensure that
the correct inventor is credited with any invention.”191
So potent is the association of patents with invention and
innovation, that a robust social sciences literature has emerged
that uses patents and patent citation data as measures of inventive
activity.192 Economists routinely use patent metrics in testing
theories and assessing the evidence supporting historical claims
about technological progress and innovation generally.193 Clarisa
Long summarizes: “Econometric models of firm productivity often
create a patent production function in which patenting is a
dependent variable and inventive output by the firm is an
independent variable.”194 The link is not indisputable or perfect,
but the existence of these studies illustrates its presence.
None of this is to suggest that the social meaning of patents
should be seen as a monolithic, homogenous construct; as
recognized at the outset of this section, it is not. In particular, the
audience matters.195 Each of the sources described above can be
seen as speaking or reflecting different possible audiences. A
patent might have a specific meaning in one community, and a
different meaning in another. And yet, the central point is that
there is enough commonality of the social meaning of a patent for
it to have a widely-recognized effect; more so than many other
cultural structures. Taken together, there are enough pixels to
form a distinct image in which patents are strongly associated with
191. Hubbard, supra note 14, at 398, 400.
192. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe & Gaétan de Rassenfosse, Patent Citation Data
in Social Science Research: Overview and Best Practices, 68 J. ASS’N INFO. SCI. &
TECH. 1360, 1366  68 (2017) (reviewing literature on use of patent citation data);
Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation in Economic History, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 241,
244 (2016) (observing that “patent counts have become the standard proxy for
innovation” and cautioning that it is important to keep in mind that “patents are
an ‘imperfect, fallible measure’ of the ‘net accretion of economically valuable
knowledge” (quoting Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A
Survey, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 1661, 1670 (1990)).
193. Moser, supra note 192, at 244. For a classic example of this literature,
see Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON.
LIT. 1661, 1670 (1990).
194. Long, supra note 5, at 651.
195. See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97
MINN. L. REV. 72, 75 (2012) (arguing that patent law could operate more
effectively if it “incorporated a more realistic conception of its audience”).
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inventions and practical innovations. It is this core meaning that
allows an individual named on a patent to show the world that “I
am an inventor.”196
B. Legitimacy, Information, and Necessity
How have patents become such powerful social artifacts?
the following analysis, we apply our model of credentials
patents. This analysis illuminates how, through their role
formalized abstractions, patents have come to serve
mechanisms of reputation.

In
to
as
as

1. The Legitimacy of the Issuer
Who issues patents? The answer is the Federal
Government,197 traditionally an entity with a high degree of
legitimacy. It makes the laws, after all. And the Patent Office is
one of the most legitimate government agencies, with a heritage
going back almost to the first days of the country. As described in
Part III, examiners in the Patent Office follow extensive
procedures to ensure that the requirements of patentability are
met. Every patent ever issued—except for some of the early
patents destroyed in the Patent Office fire of 1836—is available for
public search and review.198 Patent examiners are not perfect, but
no examination is perfect either. In short, it is difficult to find
another issuer of credentials, public or private, with the
widespread recognition and legitimacy of the Patent Office.
Two aspects of the Patent Office are worth mentioning. Since
U.S. patents, unlike many other types of credentials, are issued by
196. See John Seabrook, The Flash of Genius, NEW YORKER (Jan. 11, 1993),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1993/01/11/the-flash-of-genius (last visited
Feb. 19, 2019) (“I want you to understand that I am wearing a little badge here,
and that badge says that I am an inventor, and it says I am a net contributor to
society.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
197. See
General
Information
Concerning
Patents,
USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerningpatents (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (stating that the USPTO issues all patents
in the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
198. See id. (stating that the USPTO maintains a search room for public use).

350

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311 (2019)

a single entity, whose modern formal name is the United States
Patent and Trademark Office,199 the only way to get a United
States patent is through that entity.200 Contrast this with
educational credentials—such as high school diplomas, college
degrees, or a Ph.D. in marine biology—that are issued by an array
of different institutions, each with their own reputation and
identity. The audience of a patent need not evaluate the relative
weight of different issuers of a patent. This unity enhances the
legitimacy of the issuer of a credential. The same Patent Office that
issued Thomas Edison’s patent on the incandescent lamp issues all
other patents.
In addition, the consequences of defying the obligations
imposed by statutory patent law and the rules of the Patent Office
during prosecution help maintain its legitimacy. These obligations
flow from the doctrine of inequitable conduct, which sharply
punishes applicants who behave inappropriately during patent
prosecution.201 “To prevail on the defense of inequitable conduct,
the accused infringer must prove that the applicant
misrepresented or omitted material information with the specific
intent to deceive the PTO.”202 Although the Federal Circuit has
raised the thresholds for both materiality and intent in recent
years,203 the doctrine remains potent. This is particularly true
given the consequence of an inequitable finding, which is to render
199. That said, other countries have their own patent offices, and it is possible
to envision a world in which different countries’ patent offices compete in the
same way that academic institutions compete. The comparative social meaning of
patents is a subject that is certainly worth further investigation.
200. See supra note 197 and accompanying texts (noting that only the USPTO
issues patents on behalf of the United States government).
201. See Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton
Dickinson: A First Impression, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 226, 228 (2012) (describing
inequitable conduct as “a judicially created doctrine developed to punish patent
applicants who behave inappropriately during patent prosecution, the ex parte
process of patent creation.”); see also Long, supra note 5, at 668–70 (describing
the role that the inequitable conduct doctrine plays in the process of patent
signaling).
202. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc).
203. See id. at 1290 (“This court now tightens the standards for finding both
intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to
the detriment of the public.”).
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the entire patent unenforceable and generally leads to an award of
attorneys’ fees against the party asserting the patent.204 Antitrust
claims are also possible.205 Furthermore, patent attorneys who
breach their duty of candor to the Patent Office may be subject to
discipline, including losing their license to practice before the
office.206 All of these mechanisms encourage fair dealing by the
applicant.
2. The Information Communicated by a Patent
The social meaning of patents is one thing, but what about the
quality of the information that is actually provided? Patents, it
turns out, fit well into notions of direct communication of the
bearer’s achievement of certain criteria, signaling, and sorting.
a. Direct Communication of Information
As Clarisa Long observes, “In the most straightforward
instance, obtaining a patent on an invention communicates
information about the invention to the public at low cost.
Individual patents can contain a wealth of otherwise unobtainable
information about the invention and are often quite lengthy.”207
These disclosures can both provide information about the technical
content of the invention,208 as well as nontechnical information
204. See id. at 1288 (“Unlike validity defenses, which are claim specific, see
35 U.S.C. § 288, inequitable conduct regarding any single claim renders the entire
patent unenforceable.”); Jeffrey D. Mills, Patent Litigation Two Years after
Octane Fitness: How to Enhance the Prospect of Recovering Attorneys’ Fees, 45
AIPLA Q.J. 27, 52 (2017) (observing that “inequitable conduct has been long
recognized as a sufficient basis, by itself, for declaring a case exceptional and
awarding fees.”).
205. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A
Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 549– 52 (2015) (describing circumstances in
which Walker Process fraud might be alleged (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc.
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 80 (1965)).
206. See Tamsen Valoir & David Hricik, Patents and Trademarks: The Duty
of Good Faith, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 287, 293 (2007) (describing the
consequences of violating the duty of candor).
207. Long, supra note 5, at 647.
208. For an overview of the purposes served by patent law’s disclosure
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about the invention and its inventors.209 Put simply, patents codify
information.210 Of course, these disclosures are hardly perfect; an
extensive literature has catalogued the information that is not
provided by the disclosures, and the incentives to reveal as little as
necessary.211 Worse perhaps, patents—especially the claims—are
often written in “patentese,” which Sean Seymore defines as “the
specialized language that patents are written in.”212 But, for those
patents that are written clearly and logically213 or for those readers
requirement, see Rantanen, supra note 115, at 370. For an in-depth discussion of
the disclosures of patents, see J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 917, 940  46 (2011) (noting that disclosure is the principal benefit the
public receives from the patent system); Jeanne Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94
IOWA L. REV. 539, 544 60 (2008) (analyzing the theory of patents and the current
role of patents in research); Timothy Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU
L. REV. 123, 131 (2006) (“[T]he primary function of the patent system is to promote
public welfare through the disclosure of new inventions.”); Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545,
554  61 (2012) (reviewing disclosure as a compelling justification for patents);
Sean Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621,
627 (2010) (critiquing the current form of the patent, including the current
disclosure framework).
209. See J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573,
159097 (2016) (“Nontechnical disclosure is the ability of a patent to disclose
information that is not related to the traditional disclosure goal of teaching.”).
210. See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009, 1017 (2008) (discussing the role of patents in
knowledge codification).
211. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing patent law’s
disclosure requirement); see also Burk, supra note 16, at 1610 (describing the
various silences resulting from disclosure); id. at 101416 (discussing the concept
of “tacit knowledge”).
212. See Seymore, supra note 208, at 634 (noting that “patentese stretches the
disclosure”); see also Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d
1512, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting) (“We have made the
infringement analysis so convoluted it is impossible for most district court judges
untrained in ‘patentese’ to follow, much less jurors.”), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
213. See Janice M. Mueller, Crafting Patents for the Twenty-First Century:
Maximize Patent Strength and Avoid Prosecution History Estoppel in a
Post-Markman/Hilton Davis World, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCIETY 499,
503 (1997)
Although the phrase “reader-friendly” as applied to “patents” may at
first seem trite, if not borderline heretical, “reader-friendliness” has
now become an essential benchmark for patent drafters. The
sophisticated patent attorney will strive to make the job of judge and
jury easier by crafting a clearly-written, logically laid-out patent
document.
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that can understand “patentese,” a patent can function like a set
of CliffsNotes for the technology, allowing the reader to quickly get
up to speed on what the inventor has actually done. In legal terms,
what the inventor was in possession of at the time of filing.214
In addition to the actual content of the patent itself, the
criteria necessary to obtain a patent helps communicate
information about the credential. By issuing a patent, the Patent
Office certifies that the invention claimed meets these criteria.215
With a patent, those basic criteria are mostly easy to understand
and convey. To be deserving of a patent, an invention must be
novel, it must be useful, and it must be nonobvious.216 These
criteria are so simple, they can be conveyed in a children’s book.
Take, for example, the book Inventions: That Could Have Changed
The World . . . But Didn’t!217 Its shtick is that it describes
inventions that are interesting and creative, but which were
largely commercial flops. Things like a parachute hat for escaping
from a tall building. Early on in the book, the author describes
what the inventions are, where they come from, and tells the
reader about patents. Here’s an excerpt that illustrates how easy
it is to convey the basic criteria of a patent:
Not all patents are approved. In fact, in order for your invention
to receive a patent, it has to pass three tests. Test #1: Is it novel?

214. See Ariad Pharms. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc)
A description of the claimed invention allows the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to examine applications effectively;
courts to understand the invention, determine compliance with the
statute, and to construe the claims; and the public to understand and
improve upon the invention and to avoid the claimed boundaries of the
patentee’s exclusive rights.
215. See supra note 197 (“The examination of the application consists of a
study of the application for compliance with the legal requirements . . . . If the
examiner’s decision on patentability is favorable, a patent is granted.”).
216. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012). The exception may be patentable subject
matter—an issue that in the last few years has entered a crisis state among
patent attorneys.
217. See generally JOE RHATIGAN, INVENTIONS: THAT COULD HAVE CHANGED
THE WORLD . . . BUT DIDN’T! (2015).
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In other words, is it new or does it have a new part that another
inventor hasn’t already thought of?
Test #2: Is it useful? Does your invention have a practical use
and can someone actually create it?
Test #3: Is it inventive? This means that your invention isn’t
obvious and couldn’t have been thought of by just anyone with
basic knowledge about the subject.218

Patents also readily communicate who the inventor is. A
simple, yet powerful way that a patent communicates that the
person named on it is an inventor is by stating it right on the top
of the patent itself. Figure 1219 is a reproduction of the top portion
of U.S. Patent No. 8,000,000. It is readily apparent who the
inventors of this visual prosthesis are: Robert J. Greenberg, Kelly
H. McClure, and Arup Roy.

Older patents emphasized the inventors’ names to an even greater
extent, as Orville and Wilbur Wright’s patent on a
“Flying-machine” illustrates in Figure 2.220

218.
219.
220.

Id. at 8.
U.S. Patent No. 8,000,000 B2 (issued Aug. 16, 2011).
U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (issued May 22, 1906).
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Battles over the ownership of patents are classic stories in
American society and culture, often invoking themes of the
underdog, or reaping what one has sown, or of monopoly and
competition. A strong thread of the true inventor’s natural rights
entitlement to a patent runs through these stories.221 Consider the
inventorship battles of O’Reilly versus Morse;222 of Bell versus
Gray;223 of Edison versus Westinghouse;224 of the Wright
Brothers,225 or, more recently, of Doudna versus Zhang over
CRISPR.226 These inventorship battles captured the public eye.
History records the winner of the patent as the inventor; the loser
is relegated to counter-narratives at best. In this way, patents
221. See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 154 (describing the mass of patent
infringement claims involved in the invention of the sewing machine).
222. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 63 (1854) (deciding the true inventor
of the electro-magnetic telegraph).
223. See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1 (describing Bell’s battle to claim his
patent).
224. See Consolidated Electric Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S.
465 (1895) (deciding the rightful inventor of an electric light); FREEBERG, supra
note 33 (describing Edison’s race to file his patent). The story of Edison’s patent
fights forms the heart of Graham Moore’s legal thriller, The Last Days of Night
(2016), soon to be a major motion picture.
225. See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 151 (describing the Wright Brothers’
patent litigation).
226. See Jacob S. Sherkow, Inventive Steps: The CRISPR Patent Dispute and
Scientific Progress, 18 EMBO REP. 1047, 1047  50 (2017) (discussing the litigation
surrounding the CRISPR patent and its implications in the field of molecular
biology).
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build the historical record. Want to know who invented the X? Just
look it up—the inventor is clearly indicated. Indeed, the author of
The Psychology of the Inventor observed that this feature was what
made it so advantageous to use patents as the mechanism for
identifying the inventors he studied: “The great advantage in
limiting the study to patentees arises from their accessibility
through the records of the Patent Office. The patentee can be
readily identified with a definite invention which has received the
approval of the Government.”227
b. Patents as Signals
In addition to compressing information about the invention
that the inventor has received a patent for, patents provide
information about the bearer in more complex ways.
The concept of patents as signals of firm attributes that are
not easily discernible is the subject of an extensive description and
analysis in Clarisa Long’s 2002 article Patent Signals.228 The
essence of Long’s theory is that “Intellectual property [and patents
in particular] can serve as a signal of less readily measurable
attributes.”229 Long elaborates on the signaling function of a firm’s
patents:
Under numerous explorations in signaling theory, parties
signal positive attributes by engaging in costly behavior that
parties without positive attributes would find hard to mimic.
Just as a firm may use conspicuous consumption of advertising
as a means of conveying a message about itself, so firms may
also use conspicuous consumption of patents as a means of
displaying desirable qualities. At the very least, if a firm were
to obtain far more or fewer patents than similarly situated
firms—particularly competitors in the same industry—its
conspicuousness would communicate some sort of information
to the market.230

227. See ROSSMAN, supra note 145 (studying the motivations and psychology
of the patentee).
228. Long, supra note 5.
229. Id. at 646.
230. Id. at 648– 49.
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Long also suggests that patents may be an effective signal of
low future discount rates because “obtaining patents may be a
signal of the firm’s willingness to invest in making credible
statements, because patentees can suffer costs if the information
in the patent turns out to be inaccurate.”231
Long’s model provides a way for investors to distinguish
between “innovative firms”—those that “have a portfolio of
research projects that managers believe will have a high expected
payoff on average”—and “boring firms”—those that “have a
portfolio of research projects that they believe will have low
expected payoffs.”232 Assuming that information is asymmetric
(that is, investors don’t know whether they are investing in
innovative or boring firms, but the firms know what type of firm
they are), there is no way for investors to distinguish between the
two types. Long theorizes that patents provide a way for innovative
firms to signal their innovative characteristic.233 Patents can do so
if the behavior—obtaining the patent—“imposes substantial
monetary or reputation costs if the signal is inaccurate.”234
Patents, Long argues, meet these criteria: the consequences of
intentional misrepresentations in a patent application are severe;
in addition, it may be less costly, in theory, for innovative firms to
meet the criteria necessary to obtain patents than for boring firms
to do so.235
Although proposed in the context of firms and capital markets,
Long’s theory of patent signaling is applicable to individual
inventors as well, although with a bit of a twist.236 Patents present
administrative challenges and expenses to obtain. Only true
231. Id. at 649.
232. Id. at 655.
233. See id. at 656 (“[I]nnovative firms will have an incentive to disclose the
superior nature of their research results so that they can appear more attractive
to investors.”).
234. Id. at 657.
235. See id. at 657–58
Innovative firms desiring to maximize firm value have the incentive to
seek patents, and therefore to signal accurately, if their cost . . . of
doing so is less than the change in value an innovative firm would
experience by being labeled a boring firm . . . . [A] signal can still
produce a separation between innovative and boring firms when it is
not costly to send the signal but costly to send it falsely.
236. Long, supra note 5.
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inventors—or those who think that the patent is valuable—may
be willing to undertake these expenses. The value of a patent as a
signal of economic worth of the individual may cause individuals
to seek patents even if the exclusionary value is relatively low. The
desire for approbation may also push individuals to seek patents.
Of course, if the process is such that it is equally easy for a
non-inventor to obtain a patent as it is an inventor, then the signal
is of limited value. But just as it may be less costly for an
innovative firm to obtain patents, it may be less costly for an
inventor who has already invented to obtain a patent for her
invention. To put it another way, the costs of signaling one’s
inventiveness through a patent are lower for a person who has
created an invention—sparked by whatever reasons for inventing
she is driven by237—than for one who has not. And just as obtaining
patents may be less costly for Long’s “innovative” firms than for
“boring” firms, it may be less costly for the naturally inventive than
for the person who lacks that characteristic.238
c. Patents as Filters
Just as patents may function as signals of an individuals’
tendency towards inventiveness, or at least of the creation of an
invention, so too may patents function as filters that select for
those who possess a particular characteristic.239 In this sense,
patents function less as costly indicators of a characteristic and
more as a straightforward selection mechanism. The dirt is sifted
through the pan and gold is left on top. Here, the gold are those
inventions that possess the necessary characteristics, along with
those individuals who possess the ingenuity necessary to invent.
Consider, for example, the doctrine of non-obviousness. The
doctrine “measures whether subject matter claimed to be
patentable is a sufficient technological advance over existing art to
237. An extensive literature discusses reasons why creators create and
inventors invent for reasons other the monetary reward of a patent. See supra
notes 35–36, 43 and accompanying text.
238. Long, supra note 5, and accompanying text.
239. See Merges, infra note 241, at 17 (describing the factual inquiries taken
to determine the validity of a patent).
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warrant the grant of a patent.”240 In theory, at least, this statutory
test “serves a gatekeeping function; it seeks to reward inventions
that, viewed prospectively, have a low probability of success.”241
But a patent is not merely a reward for investing in the chase; it is
only obtainable for the capture of the invention—to the victor go
the spoils.242 Patent law thus grants patents to those who have
succeeded at producing an invention that at the end of the
day— after assessing the scope and content of the prior art, the
differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, and
the level of ordinary skill in the art—is nonobvious.243
What the patenting process does, then, is filter out those
results that are not inventions from those that are. In so doing, it
also filters out those who are not inventors from those that are.
And although patent law specifically instructs that “the manner in
which the invention was made” cannot negate patentability,244 it’s
not as if the underlying characteristics of the inventor and the
circumstances of invention have no effect at all. If that were so, the
world would be a much more homogenous place.245
3. The Necessity of Relying on the Credential
The mechanisms described above explain how a patent can
provide information about the bearer. But why rely on such
compressions and even more complex mechanisms? After all, isn’t
it better to read Herman Melville’s Moby Dick itself than the
CliffsNotes? Or worse, to rely on the fact that someone is named
240. Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, In Memoriam Best Mode, 64 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 125, 127 (2012).
241. Robert Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (1992).
242. See Lemley, supra note 187, at 749 (describing the racing theory of patent
law).
243. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 – 18 (1966).
244. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018).
245. None of this should be taken to suggest that patent examination is a
perfect filter; that is hardly so. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the
Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1528 (2001) (“The law should not ignore the
fact that a patent application has been examined, but it seems clear we give that
examination process far too much weight.”). But, more on this in Part V.
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an inventor without even closely examining the patent? The short
answer—as it is with many credentials—is that direct observation
of the experience is typically difficult, if not impossible.
While the basic criteria that must be satisfied to obtain a
patent are simple enough to understand,246 they can be awfully
hard to assess in light of the technical and often highly detailed
subject matter of the invention. Furthermore, they are evaluated
through a rigorous examination process.247 This is where use of a
person with expertise to determine whether those criteria are
satisfied comes into play. The nuances of patent law can be
complicated, but it’s the technical questions of patentability that
often makes the subject impenetrable. Examiners with an
understanding of the field are tasked with figuring out whether
the invention meets the criteria for a patent.248 Of course, they’re
not perfect, but perfection isn’t the point. A reasonable assessment
of whether the facts of the invention meet the criteria for
patentability is what matters. In other words, it isn’t easy to know
whether something is an invention or someone is an inventor. The
audience must mostly rely on the proxy—the credential—of a
patent.
While the patent can provide information about the invention,
as described above, that disclosure is not complete. And while some
individuals may be able to examine the contents of the patent, and
assess the quality of the inventor’s contribution, most people
cannot. Even though patents disclose the invention, they do so in
their own language, a hybrid of technical and legal terminology—a
characteristic that Timothy Holbrook refers to as the “Janus-like
nature” of patents249—and Sean Seymore and others describe as
246. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 03, 112 (2012).
247. See id. § 131 (stating that the “[d]irector shall cause an examination to
be made of the application and the alleged new invention”).
248. See General Information, supra note 197 (“The work of examining
applications for patents is divided among a number of examining technology
centers (TCs), each TC having jurisdiction over certain assigned fields of
technology.”).
249. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND.
L.J. 779, 781 (2011). “Janus” is a figure of ancient Roman mythology that is
typically depicted as having two faces. Janus, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Janus-Roman-god (last visited Feb. 19, 2019)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For difficulties with the
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“patentese.”250 As most patent doctrines revolve around the
touchstone of the “person of ordinary skill in the art,”251 patents
are necessarily written for those of skill in the art; they are not
designed to be understandable to those outside that club.252
Rather, it is largely the non-technical disclosures—application
date, patent name, assignee—that are accessible to the general
audience.253 And the identity of the inventor is one such
non-technical disclosure. Thus, the patent itself more easily
conveys to society who the inventor is than the specific details of
the invention. The public can easily understand the patent as
indicating the identity of an inventor, even where it might be
impossible without extensive training in that field to evaluate the
inventive contribution described in the patent.
If the inventive contribution described in the patent is difficult
for the public to appreciate, the more generalized intellectual
contribution of the inventor may be even more so—especially
where that generalized contribution is supported by little or no
evidence. David and Partha describe the difficulty of evaluating
scientific discoveries, a concept that transfers to inventions to some
degree:
approachability of patent law generally, see Janis & Holbrook, supra note 195.
250. Seymore, supra note 208, at 633; Mueller, supra note 213, at 503; Hilton
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Nies, J., dissenting) (“We have made the infringement analysis so convoluted it
is impossible for most district court judges untrained in ‘patentese’ to follow, much
less jurors.”), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
251. A term often shortened to “POSITA” or “PHOSITA.” For a discussion of
the role of the PHOSITA in patent law doctrine, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 889  96 (2004) (discussing the role of PHOSITA in
judicial decisions); Holbrook, supra note 249, at 781 (“In almost every area of
patent law, the court or jury should view the issues from the perspective of the
PHOSITA, not that of a lawyer or layperson.”); Greg Reilly, Rethinking the
PHOSITA in Patent Litigation, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 501, 503 (2016) (“Decision
makers must resolve many patent law issues from the perspective of a ‘person
having ordinary skill in the art’ (‘PHOSITA’) (i.e., an average technical person in
the relevant field).”).
252. See Holbrook, supra note 249, at 781 (“Consequently, the description in
a patent need not include information already known by the PHOSITA, which
permits applicants to submit simpler patent disclosures.”).
253. See Anderson, supra note 209 and accompanying text (describing the
secrecy surrounding patent law).
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For the public at large are incapable of screening scientists by
their innate abilities, and they are equally incapable of
evaluating the relative importance of scientific discoveries; not
only does one scientist look much like another, one publication
looks pretty much like another, as well! So scientists are
themselves commodities of uncertain quality to the public, as
are their past publications.254

To be sure, it may be possible to appreciate and evaluate the
quality of an invention when it is embodied in an artifact, such as
an actual “beerbrella”255 or the USB port on a computer.256 And yet,
how can the public know—from the existence of a physical
artifact—that a particular individual invented it? Patents provide
that evidence; more, they have historically provided a framework
for contests between inventors in which other types of evidence can
be weighed.257 It is difficult to assess whether an invention is truly
“new.” Generally, an audience does not have days or weeks to
assess whether someone really has an invention or not. The
audience must necessarily rely on the credential—the patent—as
the best source of information about whether a person making a
claim to be an inventor really is one.
V. Examples of Patents as Credentials
This Part provides a few examples of credential uses of
patents. A credential use is one where the abstraction of a patent
plays an important role in communicating with an audience or
making a determination.258 Each of these examples use the patent
as credential in slightly different ways based on who the audience
is. Together, they lend support to the conclusion that patents serve

254. Dasgupta Partha & Paul A. David, Toward a New Economics of Science,
23 RES. POL’Y 487, 505 (1994).
255. U.S. Patent No. 6,637,447 (issued Oct. 19, 2001).
256. See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 385 (describing the Intel commercial
about the co-inventor of the USB drive).
257. See Dane, supra note 104 and accompanying text (describing the
post-Alice landscape of Federal Circuit jurisprudence and proposing possible
improvements).
258. See supra Part III (describing patents as credentials).
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as a credential for named inventors, whether as proof of inventive
talent, technological skill, or qualification for a job.
The examples we give are necessarily under inclusive;
virtually every reader of drafts of this Article offered their own
suggestions. One of the most powerful is that of Bob Kearns in
John Seabrook’s 1993 New Yorker article, The Flash of Genius.259
Seabrook describes Bob Kearns’s patenting of the intermittent
windshield wiper and his efforts to enforce his patent against the
giants of the automobile industry.260 Seabrook writes of that
litigation:
At a hearing in 1980, Kearns said, “I want you to understand
that I am wearing a little badge here, and that badge says that
I am an inventor, and it says I am a net contributor to society.
And it is like maybe you can’t see the badge, and these other
gentlemen can’t see the badge, and I don’t think anybody is
going to be able to see the badge until my trial is finished in this
courtroom and I will find out whether I am wearing the badge
or not.”261

Kearns’s quotation is revealing of an underlying theme: that many
inventors view patents as more than the stark economic
instrument they are legally meant to be.262 Rather, inventors view
a patent as a strong symbol of inventor-status and as evidence of
an underlying inventive quality. This status may manifest in
monetary terms, such as in seeking employment, or in ways that
cannot easily be quantified by money alone. The below examples
illustrate both aspects of patents as credentials, recognizing also
that they are often intertwined and not easily disentangled.
A. Credential Uses of Patents in Universities
Institutions of higher education frequently showcase their
patents and named inventors. The University of Iowa Engineering
department provides a prime example. A central feature of the
259. See Seabrook, supra note 196 (describing Seabrook’s journey to patent
his invention of windshield wipers).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See id.
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engineering building is a large display of plaques representing the
department’s many granted patents.263 Iowa Engineering is in
good company: institutions of higher education across the country
feature their issued patents in buildings and online.264 In addition
to showcasing issued patents in prominent displays, many
universities host annual award ceremonies where inventors are
publicly recognized and given plaques.265 The practice of
recognizing inventors identified by patents obtained suggests a

263. See picture on file with the authors.
264. See, e.g., Patent Wall of Fame, U. ALASKA ANCHORAGE,
https://www.uaa.alaska.edu/research/office-of-research-and-graduate-studies/
office-of-research-technology-commercialization/patent_wall_of_fame.cshtml
(last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (featuring the inventors listed on patents such as the
“Fish Carcass Disposal System” and “Data Hiding Based Messages and
Advertisements”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); A Brief
Guide
to
Technology
Transfer,
N.C.
A&T
ST.
U.,
http://www.ncat.edu/research/dored/tech-transfer-guide.html (last visited Feb.
19, 2019) (featuring the University’s “Patent Gallery”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Faculty Patents, THAYER SCH. ENGINEERING
DARTMOUTH,
https://engineering.dartmouth.edu/research/entrepreneurship/patents
(last
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (featuring the school’s invention wall and listing patents
held by faculty) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
265. See, e.g., 2016 Inventor Award Ceremony & Reception, U. TEX. AUSTIN,
https://research.utexas.edu/otc/about-otc/programs-and-events/event-2016inventor-award-ceremony-and-reception (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (detailing the
program for an annual event honoring university inventors granted U.S. Patents)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 2017 Patent Awards Ceremony
Honorees, GEO. U., https://otc.georgetown.edu/pac2017awardees (last visited Feb.
19, 2019) (listing inventors honored at the university’s annual patent awards) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Kevin Coss, Recognizing the U’s
Most
Entrepreneurial
Innovators,
U.
MINN.
(Mar.
29,
2017),
https://research.umn.edu/inquiry/post/recognizing-u%E2%80%99s-mostentrepreneurial-innovators (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (describing the University
of Minnesota’s Inventor Recognition Event, recognizing 220 university inventors
whose technology had been recently licensed or patented) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Jennifer Pittman, Campus Inventors
Recognized for Recent Patents, U. CAL. SANTA CRUZ (Dec. 12, 2016),
https://news.ucsc.edu/2016/12/inventor-recognition.html (last visited Feb. 19,
2019) (spotlighting inventors within the university) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). For a general discussion of inventor recognition programs,
see Inventor Recognition Programs an Effective Form of Internal Marketing, TECH
TRANSFER CEN. (Aug. 31, 2011), http://techtransfercentral.com/2011/08/31/
inventor-recognition-programs-an-effective-form-of-internal-marketing-2
(last
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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credential use of the patent by the universities—one that has
gradually shifted from distaste to desirability.266
Patents are often features on the curriculum vitae of
professors. A review of the websites of professors in the
bioengineering department at the University of Iowa provides
numerous examples of professors with issued or pending patent
applications reflected on their curricula vitae.267 Those researchers
are hardly exceptions.
The concept of patents as credentials also provides a possible
causal explanation for why, as empirical studies demonstrate,
academic researchers believe that patents add to their
reputation.268 Patents establish to the world that the academic is
not just an academic—she is an inventor. Yet, there is also a
complex relationship between academic “credit” for patents and
other types of activities that a researcher might receive credit for,
such as article citations or grants.269 In a Nature Immunology
article written for academic researchers, for example, Janet Reed
observes that while “publishing remains the investigator’s ‘bread
and
butter’
for
academic
recognition
and
career
advancement . . . . there is a growing trend of recognizing patents
266. See Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 1013, 3639
(2013) (“Early patent policies on the part of universities reveal a unique academic
skepticism of patents.”).
267. See People, U. IOWA BIOMED. ENG’G, https://bme.engineering.
uiowa.edu/people (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing faculty members with links
to their biographies and curricula vitae) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
268. See Devrim Göktepe-Hultén, Inventing and Patenting Activities of
Scientists: in the Expectation of Money or Reputation?, 35 J. TECH. TRANSFER 401,
402 (2010) (proposing that scientists use patents and invention disclosures as
signals to gain reputation rather than financial benefits); Nicola Baldini, Rosa
Grimaldi & Maurizio Sobrero, To Patent or Not to Patent? A Survey of Italian
Inventors on Motivations, Incentives, and Obstacles to University Patenting, 70
SCIENTOMETRICS 333, 334 (2007) (surveying 208 Italian inventors of
university-owned patents and discovering that their primary goal in patenting is
to enhance prestige and reputation rather than increase personal earnings). But
see Brian Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of
University Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE
J.L. & TECH 285, 316 (2014) (finding that 85% of respondents to a survey of
computer science and electrical engineering professors do not rank patents among
the top four activities motivating their research activities).
269. See Love, supra note 268.
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as legitimate indicators of research success, especially in more
entrepreneurial academic environments.”270
B. Employer and Professional Uses of Patents as Credentials
Employers across the country recognize the achievements of
employees for a variety of activities. In certain industries,
especially those with high pressure for innovation, companies host
recognition ceremonies for named inventors on patents. One
example is Vermeer, an industrial and agriculture equipment
company headquartered in Pella, Iowa.271 The “Vermeer Inventor
Club” was initiated in 1999 to recognize inventors at a time when
the company was investing more in patented technology.272
Vermeer hosts an annual event to recognize Inventor Club
members. Each inventor receives a patent plaque, “modest cash
stipend,” and a baseball hat embroidered with the inventor’s
patent number(s).273 According to Robert R. Smith, Vice-President
and General Counsel, the hat is the least costly but is perhaps the
most valued premium offered to the inventors.274 Inventor Club
members “often wear it during work and it can have the effect of
elevating their status among their peers —particularly those with
multiple patent numbers on the hat.”275 The hat’s ability to raise
an engineer’s status among peers suggests a credential use in that
the engineers recognize that a patent represents technological skill
and innovative capacity. Additionally, the company, in recognizing
270. See Janet E. Reed, Publishing and Patenting the Fruits of Academic
Research: The Key to a Successful Parallel Track, 14 NATURE IMMUNOLOGY 523,
523 (2013) (discussing the commercialization of academic research); see also Lee,
supra note 266, at 39–46 (describing the aggressive patent practices of research
universities, notably their efforts to extend patent exclusivity to their professors’
discoveries and to patent fundamental biological processes).
271. In the interest of full disclosure, one of the authors, Rantanen, has
personal contacts with Vermeer, Deere and Rockwell Collins, and is hardly
unbiased when it comes to using Iowa firms as examples.
272. Memorandum from Robert R. Smith, Vice-President & Gen. Counsel,
Vermeer Corp., Regarding the History of the Vermeer Inventor Club (Feb. 6,
2017) (on file with authors).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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inventors, is using the patent as a credential representing a certain
level of contribution by an employee.
Vermeer’s Inventor Club is one of a multitude of examples.
Deere & Company, known for their tractors and other agricultural
and construction equipment,276 celebrates inventors on patents
with award ceremonies, plaques and other forms of peer
recognition.277 Similarly, Rockwell Collins, an aviation and
communication firm,278 views innovation as one of its core
values.279 Nan Mattai, Rockwell’s Chief Technology Officer, stated
that each inventor receives both “a monetary reward and a plaque
for each invention, presented to them by their manager usually as
part of a team celebration.”280 Microsoft gives out decorative black
cubes to inventors when a patent application is filed and inventors
display stacks of them as their “street cred.”281 One former
employee commented that “I remember interviewing for a new
position within Microsoft and feeling my hands sweat when I saw
a stack of cubes behind my interrogator.”282 And Intellectual
Ventures recently touted one of the individuals it works with,

276. See About Us, JOHN DEERE, https://www.deere.com/en/index.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (“Since our founding in 1837, John Deere has delivered
products and services to support those linked to the land.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
277. See Email from Joshua Heitsman, Senior IP Counsel, John Deere, to
author (on file with authors).
278. See About Us, ROCKWELL COLLINS, https://www.rockwellcollins.com/OurCompany.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (“Rockwell Collins . . . is a leader in
aviation and high-integrity solutions for commercial and military customers
around the world.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
279. See Email from Donna Suchy, Managing Counsel IP, Rockwell Collins,
to author (on file with authors).
280. Id. Interestingly, both Deere and Rockwell Collins indicated that they
provide recognition for non-patent innovations in addition to awards based on
patents. See id.; Heitsman, supra note 277. Thus, although patents are held up
as one type of credential, it is important to keep in mind that they are not the
only form of recognition of technological achievement. But they may be the easiest
to transfer from one community to another: an “innovation” award at one firm
may have less meaning to another firm (or the public at large) than a patent.
281. Email from Daniel Reed, Vice President for Research and Econ. Dev.,
Univ. of Iowa, to author (on file with authors).
282. CURTIS, supra note 35, at 99.
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Lowell Wood, as America’s new “most prolific inventor.”283 Why?
Because he now has more patents than Thomas Edison.284
Outside of private industry, governmental departments
engage in employee recognition for patents. For example, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) hosted a patent award
ceremony in 2015 where it recognized inventor “employees and
other individuals who have been awarded patents by the U.S.
Patent Office for their technology advancements and inventions
contributing to the homeland security mission.”285 During the
ceremony, DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology Dr.
Reginald Brothers said, “The technologies developed by our
employees that culminate in patent awards are vitally important
for the Department in attracting scientific talent . . . .”286 Brothers’
statement indicates that even the DHS relies in part on the
credential value of patents to attract talented new employees.
Parts of the military also acknowledge inventors with plaques
and ceremonies. The U.S. Armament Research, Development and
Engineering Center (ARDEC) honors inventors by placing an
image of the patent on the “Innovation Wall of Fame” and giving
them a trophy.287 And, the Naval Surface Warfare Center
283. See Nathan Myhrvold, Move Over, Thomas Edison. Lowell Wood is Now
America’s Most Prolific Inventor, INTELL. VENTURES (Nov. 4, 2015),
http://www.intellectualventures.com/insights/archives/move-over-thomasedison.-lowell-wood-is-now-americas-most-prolific-inventor (last visited Feb. 19,
2019) (celebrating Wood’s 1,085th patent and noting that he “averages about one
new U.S. patent granted every day of the week”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
284. See id. (“Between 1869 and 1933, Edison racked up an astonishing 1,084
U.S. utility patents, a record for American inventors that held for 82 years. Until
now.”).
285. See DHS Press Office, DHS Recognizes Innovators at Patent Award
Ceremony,
HOMELAND
SECURITY
(June
16,
2015),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/06/16/dhs-recognizes-innovators-patent-awardceremony (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (“The event, hosted by the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T), recognized inventors from across DHS including
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard, and the
Office of the General Counsel.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
286. Id.
287. See Audra Calloway, Picatinny Honors 11 Patent Holders During
ARDEC
Ceremony,
U.S.
ARMY
(July
11,
2016),
https://www.army.mil/article/171287/picatinny_honors_11_patent_holders_during
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Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) began hosting patent awards
ceremonies in 2012.288 At the inaugural NSWCDD event,
Catherine Donovan, Counsel to the Office of Naval Research,
explained why the Navy seeks patents for inventions. Donovan
said that one motivation was “[t]o attain international
recognition . . . for the inventors of useful, novel, and non-obvious
inventions.”289 This explanation strongly suggests that the Navy
envisions a credential benefit to the inventors of Navy-owned
patents. The patent provides an avenue for the Naval employee to
evidence her prior inventive activities, even though the employee
is unlikely to receive direct financial benefit from the invention.290
A final example of a credential use of patents can be found in
the way that some patent attorneys and patent agents highlight
their own patents when advertising legal services. The websites of
numerous patent professionals reflect that the attorney or agent
holds his or her own patent.291 This use of a patent is meant to
_ardec_ceremony (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (“The wall, which was created [in
2016], honors an innovative culture and represents successful partnerships that
focus on developing solutions for warfighters.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
288. See John J. Joyce, NSWC Dahlgren Holds Its First Patent Awards
Ceremony,
SOUTHERN
MD.
ONLINE
(May
29,
2012),
http://somd.com/news/headlines/2012/15564.php (last visited Feb. 19, 2019)
(“Receiving a U.S. patent is a significant event. It’s a formal recognition that an
invention is in a very special class of inventions— those worthy of a patent.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
289. Id. “The taxpayer benefits, the Navy benefits, and our inventors benefit”
from seeking patent protection. Id.
290. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 672-20, INCENTIVE AWARDS 5 (Apr. 1,
2014), http://8tharmy.korea.army.mil/dhrm/assets/us/labor/AK-Reg-672-20.pdf
(indicating that Army service members are awarded between $200 and $500 per
patent); see also Göktepe-Hultén, supra note 268 (proposing that monetary
incentives are often secondary for patent applicants).
291. See, e.g., General Information About the Firm, L. OFFICES DR. CLIFFORD
H. KRAFT (2016), http://www.patenttheoretics.com/Qualifications.html#Credent
(last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (“I am a patent attorney, licensed professional
engineer, inventor and researcher. . . . I hold six patents. I have over 20 other
patent applications where I am an inventor in process before the USPTO.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); About Us, SEATTLE PATENT AGENT
(2013), http://seattlepatentagent.com/about-3 (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (“Before
going into patent work, he was a professional inventor in industry, and received
11 US patents.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); My
Philosophy of Service, GALVIN PATENT L. LLC (2011), http://www.galvin
patentlaw.com/about_me (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (“I am an inventor in my own
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reflect that the professional is knowledgeable about patents and
invention, a credential use. Furthermore, at least one patent
attorney sought and received a patent exclusively for a credential
purpose. The “Beerbrella” is an umbrella-type device for use to
shade a drink in the heat of summer.292 The inventor listed on the
patent is a patent attorney who filed the patent for the purpose of
obtaining an example of his work.293 Here, the actual use of the
patent served primarily as a credential, albeit one that’s different
than the pure inventorship credential. In this case, the patent
stood as evidence of the attorney’s ability to write and receive a
patent.294
C. Patents as Credentials in Judicial Opinions
One area where the reputational effects of patents as
credentials is particularly salient is in the context of judicial
opinions in actions to correct inventorship.295 While 35 U.S.C.
§ 256 provides a mechanism for correction of inventorship on a
patent by a court,296 a petitioner must still meet the Article III
right, with 14 issued patents, one about to issue, and many more pending.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Lawrence J. Shaw, PHD: Bio and
Interests, INTEGRAL PAT., https://www.integralpatent.com/aboutme (last visited
Feb. 19, 2019) (“I am an inventor myself with 8 patents responsible for over 10
million units sold, and can bring creativity to the patenting process when
necessary.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
292. See U.S. Patent No. 6,637,447 (issued Oct. 28, 2003) (patenting “a novelty
[umbrella] accessory for use with beverages”).
293. See Gene Quinn, Obscure Patent: The Beerbrella, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 10,
2008),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2008/04/10/obscure-patent-thebeerbrella/id=146 (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (explaining that the patent holder
“felt like he needed an example of a patent application he drafted that he could
show to clients”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
294. Id. As William Hubbard describes, even patent law scholars use patents
in this way. See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 400 n.207 (“The capacity of patents
to facilitate the enforcement of norms evidently applies to patent law scholars,
too. For example, some patent law professors mention in their online biographies
that they are named inventors on patents.”).
295. See Faryniarz v. Ramirez, No. 3:13-CV-01064 (CSH), 2015 WL 6872439,
at *17–18 (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2015) (summarizing cases in which reputational
injury was alleged in the context of seeking correction of inventorship on a
patent).
296. See 35 U.S.C. § 256 (2012) (stating that if an inventor’s name is omitted
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standing requirement.297 A direct ownership interest in the patent,
or a pecuniary benefit that flows from being named an inventor
can suffice;298 but the Federal Circuit has also recognized that a
reputational injury alone from failing to be named as an inventor
on a patent may be sufficient.299
The Federal Circuit planted the seeds of reputational injury
standing theory in its 2001 decision in Chou v. University of
Chicago.300 The court wrote:
Chou argues that a reputational interest alone is enough to
satisfy the requirements of Article III standing. That assertion
is not implausible. After all, being considered an inventor of
important subject matter is a mark of success in one’s field,
comparable to being an author of an important scientific paper.
Pecuniary consequences may well flow from being designated
as an inventor.301

Standing was ultimately resolved on another ground: Chou,
the court concluded, had a concrete financial interest in the
patent.302
In 2015, the Federal Circuit squarely addressed the issue in
Shukh v. Seagate Technology, LLC,303 concluding that reputational

from a patent, the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
may issue a certificate correcting the error).
297. See Fishel v. Mich. State Univ., No. 1:15-CV-50, 2016 WL 4006820, at *3
(W.D. Mich. July 19, 2016), appeal dismissed, No. 2017-1007, 2017 WL 4541744
(Fed. Cir. July 26, 2017) (“Even a party concerned who is clearly within the
purview of § 256, however, must show that he has suffered an injury-in-fact, that
the injury is traceable to the conduct complained of, and that the injury is
redressable by a favorable decision.” (quoting Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d
1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).
298. See Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding
concrete financial interest in a patent is enough to satisfy the three requirements
for standing under Article III).
299. See Shukh v. Seagate Tech., LLC, 803 F.3d 659, 663 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(holding that “[a] concrete and particularized reputational injury can give rise to
Article III standing” and remanding to determine whether the inventor suffered
a reputational injury).
300. 254 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
301. Id. at 1359.
302. Id.
303. 803 F.3d 659 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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injury alone can be sufficient to establish Article III standing.304 In
concluding that reputational injury could be enough, the court
directly considered whether the failure to be named as an inventor
on the disputed patents harmed Dr. Shukh’s reputation as an
inventor. Even though there was no dispute that “Dr. Shukh had
a reputation as an excellent inventor,” this did not mean that “Dr.
Shukh’s omission from the patents did not harm his reputation.”305
Rather, “[t]he evidence supports the conclusion that Dr. Shukh’s
reputation as an inventor would have been higher had he been
named on the patents.”306 And ultimately, it was the effect on
future employers that mattered, employers who would necessarily
rely on the Dr. Shukh’s being named an inventor on the patent
rather than first-hand knowledge of his work:
Likewise, the testimony of Dr. Shukh’s coworkers that
additional patents would not change their impression of Dr.
Shukh’s technical abilities does not speak to whether additional
patents would improve Dr. Shukh’s reputation in the eyes of
potential employers. Dr. Shukh’s coworkers had years of
experience working directly with Dr. Shukh, unlike potential
employers, who likely lack that first-hand knowledge and are
therefore more likely to rely on their knowledge of Dr. Shukh’s
reputation in evaluating their impression of him.307

In Shukh, the court may have allowed the reputational effect of
being named an inventor to provide constitutional standing, but
there was substantial and specific evidence for the court to draw
on. A more recent case—albeit nonprecedential and involving
pleading issues—involved a failure to establish sufficient
reputational injury.308 Exactly how much of a direct reputational
showing is necessary remains an open legal question, and one for
future scholarship to explore.
304. See id. at 663 (“Today, we hold that concrete and particularized
reputational injury can give rise to Article III standing.”).
305. Id. at 665.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See Huster v. j2 Cloud Services, Inc., 682 F. App’x 910, 916–19 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (finding that a putative inventor that failed to provide any evidence of
reputational injury in a correction-of-inventorship claim did not meet the injury
requirement for Article III standing).
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D. Government and Nonprofit Patent Awards
Universities and employers are not alone in recognizing
named inventors on issued patents. Several international,
national, and local organizations recognize named inventors.
Internationally, the European Inventor Awards hosted by the
European Patent Office (EPO) recognize inventors in categories
such as industry, research, and lifetime achievement.309 A key
requirement for a nominee to qualify for award consideration is an
issued European Patent.310 The patent functions as a credential
because the EPO relies on the underlying decision to issue a patent
to support the conclusion that the inventor created new and
innovative technology.311
A similar honor exists in the United States: the National
Inventor’s Hall of Fame.312 Induction into the Hall of Fame
requires a United States patent that has contributed significantly
to the nation’s welfare and the advancement of science and useful
arts.313 Although the National Inventors Hall of Fame is an
independent nonprofit, it is sponsored by the United States Patent

309. See European Inventor Award Categories, EUR. PAT. OFF.,
https://www.epo.org/learning-events/european-inventor/about/categories.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing the European Inventor Award’s five categories)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
310. See Entry Forms for the European Inventor Award 2016 (2016) (“If you
do not specify a European patent for your chosen inventor, and we cannot identify
one after doing our own research, your entry will be eliminated from the
competition.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
311. See About the Award, EUR. PAT. OFF., https://www.epo.org/learningevents/european-inventor/about.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (stating that the
award recognizes innovation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Admittedly the EPO has some interest in promoting the value of receiving a
patent, but this self-interested purpose does not negate the use of a patent as a
credential. Id.
312. See NATIONAL INVENTORS HALL OF FAME 1, https://www.invent.org/sites/
default/files/file-upload/2018-10/2019_Company_Overview_Compressed.pdf
(describing its mission as “paying forward America’s rich history of invention and
securing our country’s competitive advantage for the future”).
313. See Nominate the Next Great Inventor for Our Hall of Fame, NAT’L
INVENTORS HALL FAME, http://www.invent.org/honor/inductees/nominate-aninventor (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (describing the nomination process) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Office, and is housed in the Patent Office headquarters in
Alexandria, Virginia.314
Numerous organizations at the state and local level recognize
“inventors”—by which they mean, inventors named on a
patent—as well. The Edison Patent Award, for example, is
sponsored by the Research & Development Council of New
Jersey.315 This award recognizes the named inventors on patents
covering technology developed, at least in part, in New Jersey.316
In most cases, the inventors recognized with the Edison Patent
Award do not have any ownership right in the patent because they
are employees of large companies.317 Using a patent as criteria for
recognizing inventors at large companies represents a credential
use of the patent, serving as an indicator of underlying innovative
characteristics not readily discerned in a different way.318 The
Florida Inventors Hall of Fame “honors and celebrates those
inventors whose achievements have advanced the quality of life for
Floridians, our state and our nation.”319 A requirement for being
314. See Our Museum is a National Monument to Innovation, NAT’L
INVENTORS HALL OF FAME, http://www.invent.org/honor/hall-of-fame-museum
(last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (noting the Museum is located at 600 Dulany Street,
which is also the address of the Patent and Trademark Office) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
315. See EDISON PATENT AWARD 2018 SUBMISSION GUIDELINES, RESEARCH &
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF NEW JERSEY 2 (2018), http://www.rdnj.org/news/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/2018-Edison-Patent-Award-Nomination-Form.pdf
(listing award criteria).
316. See id. (“[The] [p]atent must have at least part of the technical [or]
scientific work that comprises the patent . . . done in New Jersey and submitter
must be able to substantiate this.”).
317. For examples of award winners, see, e.g., RDCouncilNJ, 2014 Edison
Patent Award Honeywell Tribute Film, YOUTUBE (Nov. 14, 2014),
https://youtu.be/ci8KcN9LcV4 (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing Honeywell
employees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); RDCouncilNJ,
2014 Edison Patent Award Winner Colgate-Palmolive Tribute Film, YOUTUBE
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://youtu.be/uQkK32PJkA0 (last visited Feb. 19, 2019)
(showing Colgate employees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
RDCouncilNJ, 2011 R&D Council of NJ Bristol-Myers Squibb Edison Patent
Award Film, YOUTUBE (Nov. 30, 2011), https://youtu.be/DWoZsKafMDQ (last
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing Bristol-Myers Squibb employees) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
318. See supra Part V.B (examining employer and professional uses of patents
as credentials).
319. See generally About the Hall of Fame, FLA. INVENTORS HALL FAME (2019),
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recognized? “Must be a named inventor on a patent issued by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office.”320 The $500,000
Lemelson-MIT Prize is awarded to mid-career inventors who must
“be the primary inventor of two or more granted U.S. patents, one
of which is a product or process that has been commercialized or
has potential or realized adoption.”321
Intellectual property lawyer associations, too, recognize
inventors. Examples include the New York Intellectual Property
Law Association’s “Inventor of the Year Award322 and the Houston
Intellectual Property Law Association.323 Both organizations
require that nominees must have received one or more U.S.
patents to be eligible.324
Social organizations, too, may require patents for
membership. The National Academy of Inventors, “with over 4,000
individual inventor members and Fellows spanning more than 250
institutions worldwide” states that “to join your university or
non-profit research institute’s chapter, you must be a member of
your institution’s academic community . . . and have a patent
issued from the USPTO.”325

http://www.floridainvents.org/about (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (describing the
Hall of Fame as a state-wide initiative that encourages Floridian innovation) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
320. See
Nominate,
FLA.
INVENTORS
HALL
FAME
(2019),
http://www.floridainvents.org/nominate (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing award
criteria) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
321. See Lemelson-MIT Prize, Eligibility Requirements, LEMELSON-MIT,
http://lemelson.mit.edu/prize (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing requirements)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
322. See Inventor of the Year (IOTY) Award, N.Y. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N,
https://www.nyipla.org/nyipla/InventorOfTheYear.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2019)
(“In order to be eligible for the Award, nominees must have received one or more
U.S. patents for [their] invention(s) contributing to modern society.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
323. See Inventor of the Year, HOUS. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N,
https://hipla.org/Inventor-of-the-Year (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (calling for
nominations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
324. See supra notes 322–23 (detailing the eligibility criteria of both awards).
ACAD.
INVENTORS
(2019),
325. See
About
Us,
NAT’L
http://www.academyofinventors.org/about.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2019)
(describing membership requirements) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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E. Capitalizing on the Credential Value of Patents

A final piece of evidence supporting the idea of patents as
credentials is the “patent award” industry.326 A search for
purveyors of patent plaques and frames revealed at least five
companies engaged in the business.327 These companies’ models
depend on inventors and companies valuing a patent as an award
or achievement, similar to a college degree, worthy of a place on a
wall.328 At least one inventor, Jeff Greenhalgh, made the
connection between a patent and being officially recognized as an
“inventor” upon receipt of a certificate from a patent plaque
company.329 Recognizing oneself as inventor only after receiving a
patent and a plaque tends to support the credentialing effect of a
patent.
326. See Hubbard, supra note 14 (describing the patent plaque industry).
327. See, e.g., Patent Plaques by IPIax, IPLAX PAT. PLAQUES (2018),
https://iplax.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (presenting Wilmington, North
Carolina-based patent plaque manufacturer) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); PAT. AWARDS (2019), http://www.patentawards.com (last visited
Feb. 19, 2019) (presenting Warsaw, Indiana-based patent plaque manufacturer)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); U.S. PAT. CERTIFICATE (2019),
https://uspc.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (presenting Ft. Myers, Florida-based
professional awards manufacturer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); U.S. PAT. SERVS., INC. (2016), http://recognizinginnovation.com (last
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (presenting Grafton, Wisconsin-based patent award
manufacturer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); PATS. AS ART
(2017), http://www.patentframe.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (presenting Little
Rock, Arkansas-based patent framers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
328. See Matthew Knell, By Watson, I Am an Inventor!, TAGSMITH.ORG (Aug.
3, 2010), http://www.tagsmith.org/2010/08/03/by-watson-i-am-an-inventor (last
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (recounting the story of an inventor who did not know his
patent had been accepted and granted until he received a piece of “spam” mail
from “the ‘Official Patent Certificate’ company,” which offers to frame certificates
of recently-granted patents) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
A blog post by Matthew Knell makes it seem as if patent framing companies
actively pursue individuals recently named on patents. Id.
329. See JEFF GREENHALGH, SO, YOU HAVE A GREAT IDEA 9 (2011)
When I ordered the plaque of my first patent, as a reproduction of the
original patent provided me by the United States Patent Office, the
plaque company also included a formal certificate that says “Inventor,”
with my name and patent number on it. If the United States Patent
Office formally recognizes me as an Inventor, then yes, I am an
inventor.
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No single piece of anecdotal evidence can conclusively support
the theory that patents function as credentials in society. Indeed,
we hope this Article sparks interest in empirical research into the
credentialing function of patents. But, the present accumulation of
these examples of credential-type uses of patents in multiple
sectors of public and private life strongly indicate that patents
serve as socially acknowledged credentials. The strength of a
patent as a credential, as with any credential, is likely to vary
depending on the nature of the audience, but it seems that patents
are widely accepted across a broad array of audiences, perhaps
more readily transferable than many other types of credentials.
VI. A Normative Assessment of Patents as Credentials
Patents are widely used as credentials—that much seems
clear. But is that a good thing? The sociological literature on
academic credentials argues, almost uniformly, that credentials
are normatively bad.330 But that sociological thesis is itself
counterculture, and is set against a backdrop of a society that takes
credentials’ value for granted.331 Given this context, it is important
to examine both sides: the positives and negatives of patents as
credentials.
A. The Purpose of Credentials
A normative assessment of patents as credentials cannot begin
without thinking about the purposes that the credentialing
function of patents might serve. As noted at the outset, a common
function of credentials is to distill and abstract a characteristic or
330. See, e.g., Brown & Bills, supra note 49, at 137 (describing “credentialing”
as “a mere defensive necessity for holding mediocre . . . positions in [weak] labor
markets,” noting for example the sharp increase in degree-seekers after the 2008
recession).
331. See Kim A. Weeden, Why Do Some Occupations Pay More than Others?
Social Closure and Earnings Inequality in the United States, 108 AM. J.
SOCIOLOGY 55, 55–58 (2002) (describing credentialism—the increasing
requirement for formal qualifications such as “licensing, educational
credentialing, voluntary certification, association representation, and
unionization”—as a barrier to entry in many occupations).
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attribute possessed by the bearer into a form that is more easily
understood and processed.332 In other words, a credential provides
information about a difficult to observe aspect of the bearer. Often,
this information is being provided to a third party decisionmaker
ex ante, prior to a decision that will have consequences in the
future.333
We see this distillation as having two effects. The first is what
we refer to as the “economic” effect, in which the formalized
abstraction of a patent can be translated into monetary benefit. A
typical example is a hiring decision. Employers must typically
make decisions about whether or not a potential employee
possesses certain characteristics before having an opportunity to
observe the potential new hire in practice. Perhaps the new
employee will have the desired characteristics, such as high
productivity, but perhaps not. Credentials function as a way for
employers to mitigate the risk of hiring an employee who lacks the
desired characteristics because they provide the employer with
information about the employee.334
The second effect of the credential is as a mechanism of
self-worth for the bearer. As shorthand, we refer this concept as
the “self-worth” effect and recognize that it can take two forms:
self-validation and approbation.335 Self-validation refers to the
332. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 630 (2002)
(showing that observers may use patent documents, as well as patent portfolios,
to deduce information about patentees).
333. Id. at 659.
334. See BILLS, supra note 49, at 47–60 (demonstrating how the use of
educational credentials as a shorthand for applicant qualification results in
over-qualification and the perpetuation of inequality).
335. Although there are some threads connecting the “self-worth” effect of a
credential and theories based on personhood, the two are distinct concepts. See
Margaret Jane Radin, Property as Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958 (1982)
(exploring the relationship between property rights and personal development).
“Personhood”-based theories, which draw upon Margaret Jane Radin’s seminal
work Property as Personhood, approach intellectual property from the perspective
of the degree to which a creative intangible reflects a person’s personality. See id.
(explaining that the “personhood perspective” corresponds to the personality
theory of property)’ see also Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and
Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 87 (1998)
(applying the personhood perspective to intellectual property). “Self-worth” draws
upon the effect that self-validation and external recognition has on the individual.
Id.
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effect of overcoming a challenge external to the self. Perhaps that
challenge is obtaining a college degree or completing a marathon.
Whatever the challenge, completing it adds to one’s sense of
self-worth. Approbation is the innate desire for external validation
and recognition from others.336
The degree to which external validation is normatively
desirable is too fundamental a question to address in this
Article.337 Instead, we take it as a given that human beings desire
to realize their potential and that one component of that
self-realization is achieving validation from others. The question
then simply becomes whether or not patents effectively provide
such a challenge or offer meaningful external validation.
B. The Case for Patents as Credentials
Patents seem to fit the economic purpose of credentials fairly
well. As described above, a patent can function as a signal that the
person named as an inventor possesses inventive capabilities, such
as an ability to innovate, or as a filter for those with those
attributes.338 A patent can also function as an indicator that the
person named on the patent is someone who is willing to
participate in the patenting process—potentially a desirable
characteristic for an employer that seeks to maximize its own
patent portfolio. In these ways, patents can provide information to
336. See SMITH, supra note 36 (proposing that the desire to better one’s
individual condition inadvertently improves society as a whole). See also Maria
Pia Piaganelli, Approbation and the Desire to Better One’s Condition in Adam
Smith: When the Desire to Better One’s Condition Does not Better One’s Condition
and Society’s Condition, in HUMANISM AND RELIGION IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
THOUGHT: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE TENTH AISPE CONFERENCE 59–77 (Daniela
Fernanda Parisi & Stefano Solari eds., Franco Angeli 2010) (describing Adam
Smith’s approbation-based approach in the WEALTH OF NATIONS and MORAL
SENTIMENTS).
337. As an example of the depth of this topic, an entire psychological
literature addresses the relationship between external mechanisms and
self-esteem. See, e.g., Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszcynski, & Susan Solomon, The
Causes and Consequences of a Need for Self-Esteem: A Terror Management
Theory, in PUBLIC SELF AND PRIVATE SELF 189–212 (1986) (discussing ways in
which people try to attain and maintain a favorable self-image).
338. See supra Part IV.B.2.b (stating that patents signify desirable qualities).
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third parties, such as employers, about desirable characteristics
that the third party will only be able to directly observe after an
initial decision is made.
Indeed, unlike many other credentials, patents convey more
than information about characteristics that are difficult to observe
ex ante. They also serve to compress and distill information about
events in the past into a form that has greater meaning to others.
Specifically, they communicate the inventive activities of the
person named as an inventor. Exactly what the inventor did in the
past is difficult to observe; although that difficulty is different than
an inability to predict the future. Rather, the past can be difficult
to see into due to a lack of record evidence, different lenses worn
by the observer, and more. While an inventor’s activities may be
memorialized in notebooks and other writings,339 those materials
often will not be publicly accessible, and even if they are may be
difficult to comprehend.340
Patents can provide a single, public summary of what an
inventor actually did in the past. In this way, patents do not simply
provide information about a named inventor that is difficult to
observe ex ante; they also provide a concise, memorialized ex post
summary of what the inventor has done.341 Just as patents codify
knowledge in a multitude of ways,342 patents also codify the state
of an inventor at the time of filing by providing an evidentiary
record of what existed at that time.
339. See Tamara Monosoff, Keeping an Inventor’s Notebook, ENTREPRENEUR
(June 12, 2006), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/159556 (last visited Feb.
19, 2019) (advising that a dated inventor’s notebook acts as a record for the
USPTO to validate one’s inventive progress in case of a patent dispute) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
340. Id. (explaining that inventor’s notebooks are highly personalized).
341. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (stating that a patent must contain a “written
description” of (1) the invention and (2) the manner and process of making and
using the invention). Indeed, within patent law there are formal doctrines that
explicitly draw on the idea that what an inventor is entitled to claim exclusive
rights over is based on what the inventor actually contributed at the time of filing
as reflected in the patent application itself. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (describing the written description
doctrine and stating that a patent application must objectively demonstrate that
the applicant actually invented the claimed subject matter).
342. See generally Burk, supra note 210 (explaining that patents codify and
commodify tacit or industry knowledge).
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Patents can also satisfy the human desire for self-worth. They
represent an external challenge to be overcome, one that can only
be met by creating an invention. Meeting that challenge, as proven
to one’s self by receiving a patent, can enhance one’s sense of
self-worth.343 Patents can also offer a measure of approbation in
the form of the Patent Office’s recognition of the achievement of
invention as well as the subsequent recognition by others.344
Importantly, the meaningfulness of external validation
requires both recognition and accuracy. If the external validation
is given out to all, like a participation trophy, then it is also of little
value as a form of external recognition. Thus, the extent to which
patents function as a mechanism of external validation depends in
large part on what the audience believes about patents.345
In answering questions about the normative value of patents
as credentials under both an economic and self-worth approach,
some of the benefits of patents seem reasonably clear. For example,
if society correctly values practical innovation as a social
good—and that is a wholly different inquiry that we are willing to
answer in the affirmative for purposes of this assessment—then
the information provided by a patent seems to be reasonably
useful.346 It is not perfect, but given the relative rigor of the
examination process, the height of the bar to achieve the
credential, and the legitimacy of the issuer, it is probably better
than many other credentials at providing evidence for the
characteristic for which it stands.347 In this sense, patent
credentials may be valuable because they both recognize those

343. See SILBEY, supra note 10, at 156–57 (discussing how creators of patents
can view their creation as their “baby”); Fromer, supra note 12, at 548 (describing
how patents encourage people to invent).
344. See id. at 313 n.6 (describing the growing body of research which
demonstrates the importance to creators that they receive recognition for their
work).
345. See id. at 150.
346. See Fromer, supra note 12, at 553 n.69 (describing the social value of
patent law).
347. See Brown & Bills, supra note 49, at 136–37 (discussing some of the
criticisms of the current credentialing regime).
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individuals who have created an invention and identify to future
employers or investors those persons with inventive capabilities.348
The credentialing function of patents may be more important
than ever before in today’s world where facts seem fluid and
everything is open to debate.349 Everyone thinks they are an
expert, regardless of any actual expertise.350 The credentialing
function of patents offers one way out of this morass. It illustrates
how society can actually rely on the determinations of experts,
while at the same time maintaining a basic understanding of the
relatively simple core elements that analysis revolves around.351
We can’t all be experts in everything. But society can know just
enough about something to let the experts examine the details—at
least when it trusts the examiners.
C. Limitations and Costs of Patents as Credentials
Most of the literature on credentials, however, does not take a
laudatory approach.352 Indeed, two leading scholars of educational
credentials observe that “[o]ne sure route to infamy among
academic analysts of credentials and perhaps even in spheres of
judgment beyond these would be to write a piece extolling the
virtues of credentials.”353 Instead, “explicit public discourse about
the topic focuses on the gnarly underside of credential malfeasance
and system failure.”354 Although it is important that examination
of patents as credentials not focus wholly on the “gnarly
348. See SILBEY, supra note 10, at 182–83 (describing the multitude of ways
in which the reputational protection aspect of a patent benefits creators).
349. See id. at 149 (describing how the internet and social media has made
reputation “both more powerful and more fragile”).
350. See Lisa Guernsey, Suddenly, Everybody’s an Expert, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3,
2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/03/technology/suddenly-everybody-san-expert.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (describing how the internet
contributes to people considering themselves experts) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
351. See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 400 (describing how patents can inform
laypeople of the ideas of inventors).
352. See Brown & Bills, supra note 49, at 136 (describing how academia looks
down upon the credentialing process).
353. Id.
354. Id.
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underside” —there is dirt under every rock, after all—it is equally
important to seriously consider the negative, and perhaps outright
unsavory, consequences of patents as credentials.355 The following
discussion identifies these concerns, allowing future work to
examine them more closely.
1. Patent Law’s Imperfections
Patents are necessarily abstractions of what an inventor has
actually done. Judge Alan Lourie recognized this point in Ariad
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.356—a seminal decision
setting out the boundaries of the written description doctrine, a
critical limitation on the permissible scope of patent claims—when
he wrote that the doctrine was based on only “possession as shown
in the disclosure” rather than encompassing what else was (or
might have been) known to the inventor at the time of the
application.357 As abstractions, they necessarily omit detail, and
this can lead to skepticism.358
In any event, it is well recognized that decisions of the Patent
Office are not perfect.359 Examiners make mistakes; they have too
little time to do a perfect job (if a perfect job is even possible).360
Patentability decisions are necessarily made against the backdrop
of limited information, thus leading to errors when compared
355. See id. (describing the “gnarly underside” of the current credentialing
environment).
356. 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
357. See id. at 1351 (discussing how patents must be able to inform one of how
to recreate an invention).
358. See Brown & Bills, supra note 49, at 136 (“[C]redentials are explicit
abstractions from substantive realities— they represent something else, and this
fact undoubtedly is a prime source of recurring historical skepticism about
them.”).
359. Patent office imperfection led one scholar to write an article arguing that
such error is rational. See Lemley, supra note 245, at 1511 (“We understand
rational ignorance on the part of the PTO, in other words-the only question is how
much time we should spend per patent.”).
360. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time
Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid
Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. &
STATISTICS 550, 552 (2017) (“On average, a U.S. patent examiner spends only
nineteen hours reviewing an application.”).
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against the world as a whole.361 Indeed, just because a patent is
strong evidence of invention does not mean that only those who are
named on patents are inventors, or that it is conclusive evidence of
invention.362 Strong evidence, yes, but as the legal mechanism of
patents indicates, they are presumed valid but are not dispositive
evidence of validity.363
2. Overreliance on the Credential
Another concern is that of overreliance on the credential.
Commentators often deride professional and occupational
licensing for imposing unnecessary costs.364 While patents don’t
rise to the same level—despite the examples above, one doesn’t
need a patent to start inventing—similar concerns about the
overreliance on patents as credentials invite scrutiny.365
Inventors may not obtain a patent for a variety of reasons:
they may discover something but not turn their discovery into an
invention; they may lack the financial resources to file for a patent;
they may have conceived of innovative creative expression but not
patentable subject matter.366 While substantive requirements to
361. See supra Part III.A.1 (describing the imperfections of the patent system
as it relates to inventions).
362. See, e.g., Sherkow, supra note 226, at 1050 (describing the difficulties in
awarding credit to inventors based on patents).
363. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he patent system struggles to give appropriate credit to
researchers. . . . Patent doctrines . . . are like elections for parliamentary ridings:
Prizes are awarded only to the first past the posts the law erects, whether they
are grounded in contemporary science or otherwise.”).
364. See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 6, 23 (1976) (“The legal profession must take great care not to emulate
the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a
sharp weapon of public defense into a blunt instrument of self-enrichment.”).
365. See Lauren Flick, Inventor Alert: Patents Aren't All They're Built Up to
Be, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/16/the-case-against-patenting-yourbrilliant-invention.html (last updated Sept. 16, 2015) (last visited Feb. 19, 2019)
(“For lone inventors, patenting may not be necessary at every step of the
inventing process—and maybe not at all.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
366. See When You Should Not File a Patent, PATENTFILE,
https://patentfile.org/when-you-should-not-file-a-patent/, (last visited Feb. 19,
2019) (listing “[u]npatentable [s]ubject [m]atter,” “[t]he invention is not new or it
is obvious,” wanting to keep an invention secret, and not having a plan as reasons
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obtain a patent can address some of these concerns by defining
what is and is not an “invention” in the first place, not all
inventions are patented.367 Jonas Salk invented the polio vaccine,
but it was never patented.368 When asked who owned the patent
he famously replied “[w]ell, the people I would say. There is no
patent. Could you patent the sun?”369 Multiple explanations have
been offered for the failure to patent Salk’s polio vaccine: inability
to obtain a patent, Salk’s ethical stance, and the public-interest
nature of the organization funding the vaccine research.370 But in
the end, Salk’s vaccine—something that society could easily view
as an “invention” —did not lead to a patent.371
Ultimately, a patent, as with other credentials, is just an
indicator. It is not dispositive proof either that someone is or is not
an inventor; although that answer is complicated to the extent that
inventions are defined by patents.372 This is in line with how
patents function as a legal mechanism.373 They come imbued with
a presumption of validity and are prima facie evidence of validity,
but they are not dispositive evidence of validity or ownership.374 At
the same time, the power of patents raises a somewhat troubling
question: can one be an inventor without a patent, at least in
society’s eyes? Or is the presence of a patent necessary in order for
one to be called an inventor? Hedy Lamarr is recognized as an
inventors should not seek a patent) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
367. See JANE S. SMITH, PATENTING THE SUN: POLIO AND THE SALK VACCINE 338
(1990) (pointing out that Jonas Salk never patented the Polio vaccine).
368. See id. (explaining why Jonas Salk never patented the Polio vaccine).
369. Id.
370. See Brian Palmer, Jonas Salk: Good at Virology, Bad at Economics,
SLATE
(Apr.
13,
2014,
9:21
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/history_of_innovation/2014/04/
the_real_reasons_jonas_salk_didn_t_patent_the_polio_vaccine.html (last visited
Feb. 19, 2019) (pointing out that financial incentives drive innovation, and
therefore vaccines should be patented, even though Salk did not patent the polio
vaccine) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
371. SMITH, supra note 367, at 338.
372. See Flick, supra note 365 (emphasizing that one does not need a patent
to be an inventor).
373. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (noting that patents receive a presumption of
validity).
374. See id. (stating that “[a] patent shall be presumed valid” but allowing
challenges against such validity).
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inventor for her pioneering work on spread spectrum technology,
but would she be seen an inventor if not for being named on Patent
No. 2,229,287? 375 The answer to that question informs the deeper
question of whether one is an inventor if one doesn’t have a patent.
A related concern is that the incentive offered by a patent as a
credential may result in the undervaluing of other types of
inventive behavior that don’t lead to patented technologies.376 And
it may overvalue other work—particularly “inventions” that differ
only incrementally from what already exists and, in fact, lack more
utility than the current state of the art.377 To the extent that
patents function as credentials, the result would be the use of this
social capital to subsidize socially redundant work as the expense
of other areas of technology, such as basic science, software and
user innovations that cannot be rewarded with a patent.378
3. Mistaken Understandings of the Meaning of the Credential
A related concern is that of mistaken understandings of the
meaning of the credential, especially by those who have obtained
it. A patent is—at most—an indicator that an individual has
conceived of a new and useful invention; it is very clearly not
evidence of the economic value of the invention.379 Craig Nard
writes “the patent system neither guides inventors as to where
they should channel their inventive energies, nor guarantees
commercial success; rather, it is the marketplace that signals to
375. See Hedy Lamarr, FAMOUS WOMEN INVENTORS, http://www.womeninventors.com/Hedy-Lammar.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (stating that Hedy
Lamarr “became a pioneer in the field of wireless communications”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
376. Thanks to Peter Lee for this suggestion. See A.B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER,
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 38 (2004)
(describing how the current patent system can stifle creativity).
377. See id. (“While prizes may be an effective mechanism for drawing forth
a specific, desired technology, they are not as effective a mechanism for bringing
forth innovation in general.”).
378. See id. at 201 – 03 (describing the current patent regime’s inability to
successfully incentivize software innovation).
379. See CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 2 (4th ed. 2016) (describing
how patents do not “guarantee[] commercial success”).
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inventors where the financial rewards reside, and the costs and
benefits of a given research project.”380 Similarly, the authors of IP
and Antitrust write that an intellectual property right “is not even
a guarantee of market success. Many patented inventions are not
ever brought to market, and many published books never get
beyond their first printing.”381 The Federal Trade Commission
cautions that “although a patent can provide valuable protection
for a successful invention, getting a patent doesn’t necessarily
increase the changes of commercial success.”382 And David
Pressman’s Patent It Yourself, includes an entire section on the
need to conduct a commercial assessment of your invention.383 He
warns against the common misconception that “[a]nyone who gets
a patent will be assured of fame and fortune.”384 Nor does a patent’s
newness mean that it is necessarily superior to what already
exists.385 Pressman again cautions that “[a]lthough Madison
Avenue would like you to believe this, in reality a patent merely
means the invention is significantly different, not necessarily
superior.”386
One particular concern that mistakes about the meaning of a
patent brings is the opportunity for exploitation of those who
misunderstand what a patent means.387 “Invention promotion
scams” are a particularly pernicious species.388 In these scams, an
inventor is sucked in through late night television or other
advertisements that tout the wonders of a patent and offer a free
380.
381.

Id.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 4.02[A] (2017).
382. Invention Promotion Firms, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 2011),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0184-invention-promotion-firms
(last
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
383. See PRESSMAN, supra note 137, at 16, 80 – 94 (noting how inventors should
consider the economic realities of patent law).
384. Id. at 82.
385. See id. at 16 (rejecting the “[c]ommon [m]isconception” that “[i]f a product
has been patented, it’s bound to be superior”).
386. Id.
387. See PROTECT YOURSELF AGAINST INVENTION PROMOTION SCAMS, USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ScamPrevent.pdf (providing
tips for people to avoid becoming victims of “invention promotion scams”). A mild
example might be plaque companies that target everyone who has just been
issued a plaque in their name.
388. Id.
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inventor’s kit; ultimately, the result may be thousands or tens of
thousands of dollars lost.389 Many such scams have been targeted
by governmental entities tasked with investigating unfair
business practices. The Federal Trade Commission provides a
warning about “unscrupulous promoters” who “take advantage of
an inventor’s enthusiasm for a new product or service.”390 “They
not only urge inventors to patent their ideas or invention, but they
also make false and exaggerated claims about the market potential
of the invention.”391 IPWatchdog offers similar warnings, with a
host of examples.392 And the Patent Office itself hosts a scam
prevention page focused on invention promoters and promotion
forums.393 The number and strengths of such cautions—and the
stories of those who have been scammed—indicate that mistaken
understandings of the meanings of a patent—that it is a sure-win
get-rich ticket—are real.394
4. Patents and Equality
The conventional story of patents often features a
Schumpeterian narrative, in which patents allow new firms to
challenge existing capital.395 Viewed on the level of the individual,
patents as credentials might operate this way as well. If anyone
389. See id. (describing the ways in which invention protection scams work).
390. Invention Promotion, supra note 382.
391. Id.
392. See
Invention
Promotion
Companies,
IPWATCHDOG,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/inventing/invention-promotion-companies
(last
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (“The sad truth is that many inventors and entrepreneurs
have had their share of difficulty with the various invention promotion and idea
promotion companies out there.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
393. See Scam Prevention, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-gettingstarted/using-legal-services/scam-prevention (last updated June 27, 2018, 7:09
AM) (last visited February 19, 2019) (listing a variety of scams) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
394. See Invention Promotion Companies, supra note 392 (listing several scam
stories).
395. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPTER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY
102 – 03 (1942) (“The main value to a concern of a single seller position that is
secured by patent or monopolistic strategy does not consist so much in the
opportunity to behave temporarily according to the monopolist schema.”).
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who created an invention can walk into the Patent Office and get
a patent, then patents as credential offer an opportunity for social
movement—Jacksonian equality for all. At the same time, broader
social control over access to patents may control and limit those
who might be called an inventor.396
Consider the situation of inventors who are not white males.
Women have long been allowed to receive patents, but property
laws limiting women’s property rights into the early 1900s stymied
the practice.397 Many fewer women than men—by orders of
magnitude—obtained patents.398 During this time, when men
dominated the Patent Office, a few women utilized the patent
system to establish that they were, in fact, the inventors of a
specific invention.399 But this practice was the exception, not the
norm, and the extraordinary challenges faced by women in the
Patent Offices highlight the divide further.400 Of course, the
396. See Brian L. Frye, Invention of a Slave, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 181, 182
(2018) (noting that the Dred Scott decision limited African Americans’ ability to
acquire patents).
397. See Carrol Pursell, The Cover Design: Women Inventors in America, 22
TECH. & CULTURE 545, 546 (1981) (“[D]espite the Scientific America’s claim in
1861 that ‘women can also apply for and obtain patents upon the same terms as
the sterner sex,’ the wide range of discriminatory laws limiting women’s right to
hold and dispose of property in their own names must have influenced the
practice.”); B. Zorina Khan, Married Women’s Property Laws and Female
Commercial Activity: Evidence from United States Patent Records, 1790– 1895, 56
J. ECON. HIST. 356, 358 (1996) (“Patent grants are secured by the U.S.
Constitution and protected by the federal judicial and legal system. Nevertheless,
women inventors confronted legal limitations at the state level that affected their
ability to benefit from such rights.”).
398. See Pursell, supra note 397, at 547 (showing that in “[t]en selected years
from 1905 to 1921” an average of 34,836.9 patents were issued to men while 501.6
patents were issued to women); see also Khan, supra note 397, at 367 (“According
to Patent Office records, only 72 patents were credited to women inventors from
1790 through 1859, even though 4,773 patents were issued to male patentees in
1860 alone.”). Between 1890 and 1894, there were 1,419 women patentees and
111,535 male patentees. Id. at 368.
399. See CATHERINE THIMMESH, GIRLS THINK OF EVERYTHING: STORIES OF
INGENIOUS INVENTIONS BY WOMEN 11, 35 (2000) (discussing how inventors Mary
Anderson and Margaret Knight used the patent system to establish
inventorship).
400. See Kara W. Swanson, Rubbing Elbows and Blowing Smoke: Gender,
Class and Science in the Nineteenth-Century Patent Office, 108 ISIS: J. HISTORY
SCI. 40, 40–41 (2017) (discussing an experiment from the 1850’s in which women
worked alongside men in patent offices); Kara W. Swanson, Getting a Grip on the
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challenge is separating out access to the patent system from
underlying social and cultural constraints on invention.401 The
relationship, though, creates a potential feedback loop: limited
opportunities to access the patent system may lead to lower
numbers of patents, which in turn may lead to the lack of patents
being used as a false justification for a lack of natural ability,
which in turn may lead to fewer resources, and hence fewer
opportunities.402
African-American inventors, too, have long been allowed to
receive patents, assuming they met the patentability requirements
and excluding a short period following the Dred Scott decision.403
But practical (and at times, formal) limitations on
African-American
inventors’
ability
to
receive
patents— particularly while enslaved—meant that there were few
such inventors.404
Another narrative suggests the opposite: that patents
provided a wedge for historically disadvantaged groups to
challenge the status quo; to prove that they were the equals of the
Corset: Gender, Sexuality and Patent Law, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 57, 57 – 58
(2011) (providing a feminist analysis of patent law in part by using a patent case
in which a female inventor attempted to gain a patent for a specific type of corset).
401. See Khan, supra note 397, at 358 (analyzing “whether improvements in
married women’s property rights stimulated patenting by women inventors”).
402. See id. at 359 (“[L]ower inventiveness [in women] might also have
resulted from laws that prevented women from engaging in business or
professions.”).
403. See JIM HASKINS, OUTWARD DREAMS: BLACK INVENTORS AND THEIR
INVENTIONS 19 (1991) (“[B]lack inventors were having a . . . material impact on
society with their inventions, although only a few of them were able to receive
patents; many were refused the recognition and rewards they deserved because
they were slaves.”); PATRICIA MCKISSACK & FREDRICK MCKISSACK,
AFRICAN-AMERICAN INVENTORS 33–34 (1994) (discussing the citizenship
requirement for receiving a U.S. patent and the dramatic implications of the Dred
Scott decision); Frye, supra note 396, at 182 (noting the impact of the Dred Scott
decision upon African Americans’ ability to acquire patents).
404. See MCKISSACK & MCKISSACK, supra note 403, at 10; L.D. Cook,
Inventing Social Capital: Evidence from African American Inventors, 1843 – 1930,
48 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 507, 509–11 (2011) (identifying forty-five
African-American patent owners between 1843 and 1930, but observing that this
number may be under-representative due to the lack of racial data kept by the
Patent Office and fear that revelation of clients’ racial identity could have resulted
in negative consequences).
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dominant social group.405 Kara Swanson’s current work draws
upon the idea that patents were deployed as the tip of the wedge
that allowed white women and African-American men to advance
their own social causes.406 In this way, the formalized abstraction
of a patent allowed an entire social group to share in the observable
contributions of its members.407
VII. Concluding Thoughts
A question left open by this Article is the degree to which law
has shaped the meaning of the credential, or the meaning of the
credential has shaped the law. We see good arguments in both
directions. On the one hand, the disputes and requirements of
patent law have necessarily provided the structure for
constructing narratives about what a patent means; on the other
hand, patent law itself reflects social norms about the good and
worthwhile.408 Our society happens to value practical innovation;
not all societies do.
Yet, the role of law in defining the patent as a credential
should not be ignored, nor its consequences dismissed. In the same
way that Congress and the courts shaped society’s view of patents
in the nineteenth century, legislative changes to the patent law
and judicial decisions will shape patents’ function as credentials in
405. See Professor Kara Swanson Explores How Suffragists and Civil Rights
Activists Used the Patent System as a Political Resource, U. IOWA,
https://ibl.law.uiowa.edu/article/professor-kara-swanson-explores-howsuffragists-and-civil-rights-activists-used-patent (last visited February 19, 2019)
(“19th-century women activists and turn-of-the-century African American
activists realized they could use the patent system to further their causes.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
406. See id. (noting that Professor Swanson’s upcoming book Inventing
Citizens: Race, Gender, and the Patent System will show “how two historically
marginalized groups have utilized the patent system as a means of working
toward social equality”).
407. See id. (“Beginning in the 1880s, African American activists began
publicizing and promoting black inventors to achieve a similar goal to that of the
women inventors’ movement: to dispel the notion that they were incapable of
inventing and combat any illusions of biological inferiority.”).
408. See, e.g., Lubar, supra note 167, at 939 (highlighting a shift in public
opinion that occurred in the early nineteenth century when courts and the public
began to favor patent rights as a valuable utilitarian tool).
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the future. If we are right that patents serve as reasonably good
proxies for the human characteristic of “inventor,” and that
individuals seek patents for this reason, we should take this
function of patents into account. On balance, the exclusionary
function of patents will necessarily weigh heavily—and perhaps
commandingly so —but a focus on the exclusionary function alone
ignores the organicism and complexity of the real world.
In particular, changes to the law that take the human element
out of patents are at odds with the role of patents as important
credentials.409 For example, the 2011 America Invents Act made it
easier for assignees—typically employers—to file in the name of
the inventor.410 Employee-inventors now have even less mandatory
involvement with the patenting process than they had before,
further eroding the relationship between the individual inventor
and the patent.411 The America Invents Act also made it easier to
“correct” named inventors.412 Whereas the law prior to the America
Invents Act required the petitioner to declare that the mistake had
been made “without deceptive intent,” the post-America Invents
Act law eliminates that requirement.413 Yes, firms’ patenting
decisions are typically made by business interests and legal
departments.414 But, these legal changes perpetuate a long-term
trend in American patent law away from the human-as-inventor
and toward the business-as-inventor.415
409. See Petherbridge & Rantanen, Kesan, supra note 107, at 232 (describing
how “[a] firm with resources-and a large potential book of business [to] get its
patent applications drafted more quickly than a firm without them”).
410. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing the America
Invents Act).
411. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (describing some of the
changes the America Invents Act made to patent law).
412. See KASPER ET AL., supra note 121, at 7-33 to 7-34 (describing the
elimination of “without deceptive intent,” but adding the caveat that the
inequitable conduct doctrine continues to apply).
413. Id.
414. See Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions,
13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (1998) (describing how employers often control the
patent process of inventions created by employees).
415. See Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of
Genius’: Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830– 1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127,
1129 – 34 (1998) (describing the shift towards giving business more control over
patents as opposed to individuals); Merges, supra note 414, at 2 (“Most employees
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These changes are arguably undesirable, particularly if one
accepts the idea that patents are not merely credentials, but
especially important credentials for society to offer to those who
meet their requirements.416 This position is even stronger when
the exclusionary function of patents is not involved.417 To be sure,
it may be more efficient to take humans out of the picture
altogether, but whether that outcome is normatively good (for
human beings, at least) is questionable.418
At the same time, there is some movement in the opposite
direction. The Federal Circuit’s holding in Shukh v. Seagate
Technology, LLC,419 allowing for standing to be established based
on the reputational harm of not being named on the patent, is a
decision that is particularly consistent with the credentialing
function of patents.420
None of this suggests that patent law should only consider the
credentialing function of patents in determining the proper shape
of the law; that would be absurd.421 Surely the conventional
economic function of patents must be more important than the pat
on the head that being named an inventor offers.422 And yet, this
Article suggests that by serving as a valuable credential, patents
do provide some motivation beyond the purely exclusionary for
inventors to invent.423 That motivation is in some sense,
economic—functioning as a credential, a patent can show the value

do not hold property rights in the things they invent on the job.”).
416. See supra Part VI.B (describing the case for patents as credentials).
417. See supra Part VI.B (noting the importance of the exclusionary function
of patents in their use as credentials).
418. See SILBEY, supra note 10, at 149–83 (noting that the importance
individuals place on their patents and inventions often goes beyond a simple
monetary interest).
419. See Shukh v. Seagate Tech., LLC, 803 F.3d 659, 663 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(allowing reputational injury to give rise to standing in a patent case).
420. See id. (“Today, we hold that concrete and particularized reputational
injury can give rise to Article III standing.”).
421. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 3 (describing intellectual property
as “a large and growing part of the U.S. economy in general”).
422. See id. (noting that in 1998, “$190 billion out of total [American] exports
of $690 billion” came from “high technology products”).
423. See supra Part VI.B (noting that patents can also have use as
credentials).
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of an individual to an employer or potential investor.424 But it also
extends beyond the purely monetary in ways that may motivate
flesh and blood human beings to seek out patents.425
In the end, what we offer here is a lens through which to view
patents, one that moves away from the conventional focus on
patents as exclusionary mechanisms. We close with an emphasis
on our central thesis that patents are credentialsformal
abstractions of a person’s inventive nature. It is precisely because
of their formalization that patents have such power to capture
mind and emotion.

424. See supra Part VI.B (noting how patents can be useful as identifiers of
valuable employees).
425. See supra Part VI.B (noting how patents can provide approbation).

